Principles of Natural Justice

The principles of natural justice are the unwritten rules of fair procedure that bind every authority taking disciplinary action against a central government servant: no one may judge their own cause, no one may be penalised without a fair hearing, and the decision must carry its reasons. Article 311(2) of the Constitution guarantees their core for dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. Rules 14 to 17 of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 turn them into a step-by-step procedure.

The two classical rules have Latin names that the courts still use. Nemo judex in causa sua requires the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority to be free of bias and of prior involvement in the case. Audi alteram partem requires that the servant know the charge, see the evidence, cross-examine the witnesses, lead a defence and answer the findings before a penalty is imposed. The duty to record reasons is treated as a third requirement, summarised by the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates v. Masood Ahmed Khan on 8 September 2010, and it runs through the CCS (CCA) Rules from the inquiry report to the appellate order.

The Central Administrative Tribunal does not reweigh the evidence in a departmental inquiry, but it sets aside a penalty for bias, for denial of documents or cross-examination, for non-supply of the inquiry report, or for findings that rest on no evidence. The sections below cover the constitutional basis, the rule-by-rule codification, bias, each stage of the hearing, the inquiry report and advice of the Union Public Service Commission and the Central Vigilance Commission, minor penalties, reasons, the cases where the hearing is excluded, and the prejudice test the courts apply to a breach.

The three rules and their purpose

The principles of natural justice are judge-made and are not codified in any single statute. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, decided on 29 April 1969 with the judgment delivered by Hegde J., the Supreme Court said “The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice”, and that the rules “do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it”. Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557, decided on 12 March 2003, described natural justice as “another name for commonsense justice”.

Kraipak also removed the old excuse that natural justice applies only to judicial bodies. The Acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Naqishbund, sat on the selection board for the Indian Forest Service while himself a candidate, and the Court held that “The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated.” A disciplinary authority acting under the CCS (CCA) Rules is a quasi-judicial authority on any reading, so the rules bind it without the need to classify the function.

The content of the rules is not fixed. They adapt to the statute and the facts, which is why the same principle yields a full oral inquiry for dismissal, a written representation for a minor penalty, and nothing at all before a suspension. Where a statute or the Constitution excludes them in terms, the courts do not read them back in, a point settled for Article 311 in 1985 and covered below under the exclusions.

Constitutional basis in Articles 311, 14 and 21

Article 311(2) is the express constitutional statement of natural justice for civil servants. It provides that no member of a civil service of the Union or a State, and no holder of a civil post, shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which the person has been informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Article 311 names dismissal, removal and reduction in rank; the other penalties in Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules take their procedure from the rules.

Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300, gave the phrase “reasonable opportunity” its content: being told the charges and the allegations on which they rest, cross-examining the witnesses produced in support, leading a defence by examining oneself and one’s own witnesses, and having the case considered fairly. Khem Chand also listed a fifth element, a second opportunity to represent against the penalty proposed. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, in force from 3 January 1977, removed it. The first proviso to Article 311(2) now allows the penalty to be imposed on the evidence adduced during the inquiry without any representation on the penalty.

Articles 14 and 21 supply natural justice where Article 311 does not reach. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, decided on 25 January 1978 by seven judges, the Court held that procedure affecting personal liberty must be “right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive”, which tied fair procedure to the Article 14 guarantee against arbitrariness. Article 14 is the route by which a duty to act fairly reaches service decisions that are not penalties under Article 311, such as a premature retirement in the public interest.

The link runs in one direction only. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, decided on 11 July 1985 by a five-judge bench by four to one, the majority held that Article 311(2) “is an express statement of what the right of a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 14 would require”. Where the second proviso to Article 311(2) takes that right away, Article 14 cannot be invoked to restore it by implication.

How the CCS (CCA) Rules codify the hearing

Rules 14 to 17 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are natural justice written out as procedure, and a servant alleging a breach normally points to a specific sub-rule. Sub-rules (3) to (24) of Rule 14 govern the major penalty inquiry, Rule 15 the report stage, Rule 16 minor penalties and Rule 17 the communication of orders. The table maps each element of a fair hearing to the provision that carries it, from the DoPT compilation of the rules.

The rules are a floor. Rule 14(1) requires the inquiry to be held “as far as may be” in the manner the rule provides, and a court asks whether the servant had a fair opportunity on the whole. State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, decided on 27 March 1996, holds that a breach of a procedural provision does not by itself undo the inquiry unless it caused prejudice, while the rule against bias applies whatever the sub-rules say.

The rule against bias in disciplinary proceedings

An inquiry officer or disciplinary authority is disqualified where there is a reasonable likelihood of bias, and actual bias need not be proved. A.K. Kraipak held that “a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias.” Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611, decided on 15 October 1987, stated the test at paragraph 6 as “whether a reasonable person, in possession of relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely”, and set aside a summary court-martial on which the commanding officer against whom the appellant had complained sat.

The recurring disqualifications in service cases are prior involvement and personal interest.

• The officer is a witness or the target of the charge. In Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 578, decided on 23 March 1984 by a five-judge bench, a railway senior clerk was dismissed without inquiry by an officer to whom most of the charges related. The Court quashed the order: “No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Any one who has a personal stake in an inquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the inquiry.”
• The inquiry officer acts as prosecutor. In State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, decided on 2 February 2010, the Court held at paragraph 26 that an inquiry officer “is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government.” Even in an ex parte inquiry the department must produce its evidence, so that the inquiry officer does not act “as a prosecutor as well as a judge”.
• A personal stake in the outcome. Kraipak disqualified a selection board member who was himself a candidate, and Arjun Chaubey states the general rule that anyone with “a personal stake in an inquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the inquiry”.

Rule 14(2) lets the disciplinary authority inquire itself or appoint “an authority” to inquire, and the Supreme Court read that expression in Union of India v. K.V. Ramakrishnayya, (2010) 8 SCC 644, and Union of India v. Jagdish Chandra Sethy, decided on 18 July 2023, to include a retired officer. The proviso to Rule 14(2) makes the Complaints Committee the inquiring authority for a sexual harassment complaint under Rule 3-C of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. An application alleging bias against the inquiry officer stays the proceedings and is referred to the reviewing authority for orders, under DoPT Office Memorandum No. 39/40/70-Ests.(A) dated 9 November 1972, consolidated in the Office Memorandum of 26 March 2024.

Audi alteram partem at each stage of a major penalty inquiry

A fair hearing in a major penalty case means notice of a definite charge, access to the evidence, the right to test it, the right to answer it and an assessment that engages with the defence. Each is a stage of the Rule 14 procedure, and each has produced a line of Tribunal and court decisions.

The charge

A vague charge denies the hearing before it starts, because the servant cannot answer what is not stated. Rule 14(3) requires the substance of the imputations to be framed into “definite and distinct articles of charge” with a statement of the relevant facts and lists of the documents and witnesses by which each article is proposed to be sustained. The charge sheet cannot rely on evidence it does not list without the Rule 14(15) procedure for new evidence. Under the Explanation to Rule 14(23)(i), a finding on a charge different from the one framed is valid only if the servant admitted the facts or had a reasonable opportunity to defend against that charge.

Documents

Access to the evidence is a facet of audi alteram partem. In Raizada Trilok Nath v. Union of India the Supreme Court held that failure to supply documents relied on can vitiate the inquiry. Rule 14(11) gives the servant five days to inspect the listed documents and ten days to seek discovery of others, with a note requiring the servant to indicate their relevance. The inquiry officer may refuse a document only for irrelevance, for reasons recorded in writing under Rule 14(12), and the custodian may withhold one only on a written claim that production would be against the public interest or the security of the State under the proviso to Rule 14(13). Paragraph 4 of DoPT Office Memorandum No. DOPT-1711452233125 dated 26 March 2024 consolidates the same position.

Witnesses and cross-examination

Rule 14(14) guarantees cross-examination for every witness produced for the disciplinary authority. Statements of those witnesses must reach the servant at least three days before their examination, under the note to Rule 14(11). Material gathered in the investigation does not become evidence merely by being placed on the file. Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, decided on 19 December 2008, set aside a dismissal where documents collected by the police “were simply produced; they were not proved” (paragraph 4), treated investigation material as not by itself evidence in a quasi-judicial proceeding (paragraph 10), and held at paragraph 17 that “Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.”

The standard of proof remains the civil one. State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, held that the strict rules of evidence do not apply to a departmental inquiry and that the charge is proved on a preponderance of probability. What natural justice adds is that whatever evidence is used must have been open to challenge by the servant.

Defence assistance

Rule 14(8)(a) allows the servant the assistance of any government servant posted at the headquarters or at the place of inquiry, or at another station if the inquiry officer permits for recorded reasons. A defence assistant with three pending disciplinary cases may not take a fourth. Rule 14(8)(b) extends the choice to a retired government servant. A legal practitioner is barred unless the presenting officer is a legal practitioner or the disciplinary authority permits one, so a refusal to allow counsel where the department is represented by a lawyer breaches Rule 14(8)(a) itself.

Defence, general questioning and briefs

Once the case for the disciplinary authority closes, Rule 14(16) and 14(17) let the servant state a defence, give evidence and call witnesses, who are examined under the same rules as the prosecution’s. Rule 14(18) then requires the inquiry officer to question the servant generally on the circumstances appearing against the servant in the evidence, where the servant has not given evidence. The rule states its purpose: “enabling the Government servant to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him”. Rule 14(19) allows oral arguments or written briefs.

Ex parte inquiry

A servant who does not file a defence or does not appear loses the hearing by choice, and Rule 14(20) then allows the inquiry officer to proceed ex parte. The department must still prove its case with evidence, on Saroj Kumar Sinha, because the inquiry officer does not become the prosecutor merely because the defence is absent.

The inquiry report and the disagreement note

The servant must receive the inquiry report before the disciplinary authority decides guilt or penalty. Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, decided on 1 October 1993 by a Constitution Bench, held that a copy of the report must be furnished before the disciplinary authority reaches its decision on the charges, so that the servant can represent against the findings, and that denial of the report denies the reasonable opportunity under Article 311(2). Because the 42nd Amendment removed the hearing on the penalty, this is the last point at which the servant can influence the outcome before the order is made.

Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules now carries the Karunakar requirement and adds a second one. The disciplinary authority must send the report “together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of inquiring authority on any article of charge”, and the servant may submit a written representation within 15 days “irrespective of whether the report is favourable or not”. Rule 15(4) requires the authority to consider that representation and record its findings before proceeding to the penalty.

The disagreement note has its own line of authority. In Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84, decided on 19 August 1998, a three-judge bench held that whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge, it “must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings”. In Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739, decided on 16 September 1999, the Court quashed the dismissal of a judicial officer whom the inquiry had exonerated, holding that “The formation of opinion should be tentative and not final.” A disagreement note that already states a final conclusion of guilt fails that test even if it is sent to the servant.

There is no further hearing on the penalty. Rule 15(6) provides that where the disciplinary authority decides to impose a major penalty on the evidence adduced during the inquiry, “it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed”. A servant who believes the penalty is excessive raises it in appeal under Rule 27(2)(c), which asks whether the penalty is adequate, inadequate or severe.

Advice of the UPSC and the Central Vigilance Commission

Where the disciplinary authority consults the Union Public Service Commission, the servant must receive a copy of the advice and 15 days to answer it before the decision. Rule 15(3)(a) requires the authority to send the Commission the inquiry report, any tentative reasons for disagreement and its comments on the servant’s representation, and Rule 15(3)(b) requires a copy of the Commission’s advice to be forwarded to the servant, who may submit a written representation on it within 15 days. Rule 16(1)(d) applies the same step in minor penalty cases, and the second proviso to Rule 19 applies it where the inquiry is dispensed with. Rule 17 then requires the final order to state briefly why any UPSC advice was not accepted.

The Central Vigilance Commission’s advice has a different history. The Commission’s letter No. 99/VGL/66 dated 28 September 2000, which cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in State Bank of India v. D.C. Aggarwal of 13 October 1992, withdrew the earlier practice of treating its advice as confidential: it provided that first stage advice “may be made available” to the employee with the charge sheet for information, and that second stage advice “may be made available” with the inquiry report so that the employee could represent against both. CVC Master Circular No. 06/MC/2026, No. 024/VGL/017-6 dated 27 July 2026, was issued in supersession of all earlier Commission circulars on obtaining and implementing its advice. It requires second stage advice where the competent authority proposes an order at variance with the first stage advice (paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2), with separate provision for cases in which the order runs in the President’s name (paragraphs 8.4 and 8.5), and it contains no provision on sharing the advice with the charged officer.

Paragraph 5.25.2 of the CVC Vigilance Manual 2026 names only the UPSC’s advice as a document “required to be shared with the CO”, and paragraph 5.25.5 directs that the order should record that the Commission was consulted without quoting its advice verbatim. Paragraph 5.25.3 of the same Manual directs that in determining the penalty the disciplinary authority “should take into account only that material which the CO had the opportunity to rebut”. Whether a charged officer is entitled to the CVC advice itself, now that the 2000 letter has been superseded, is not settled by any current instrument; the 2000 letter gave the Supreme Court judgment in D.C. Aggarwal as its reason for ending confidentiality.

Natural justice in minor penalty proceedings

A minor penalty needs notice and a reasonable opportunity to represent, but not an oral inquiry unless the disciplinary authority considers one necessary or Rule 16(1-A) makes it mandatory. Rule 16(1)(a) of the CCS (CCA) Rules requires the servant to be informed in writing of the proposal to take action and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, and to be given a reasonable opportunity to make a representation. Rule 16(1)(c) requires the representation to be considered and Rule 16(1)(e) requires a finding on each imputation.

Rule 16(1)(b) leaves the oral inquiry to the disciplinary authority’s judgement in ordinary cases. Rule 16(1-A) removes that discretion in three cases, where the proposal is to withhold increments:

• in a way likely to affect adversely the amount of pension payable;
• for a period exceeding three years; or
• with cumulative effect for any period.

In each, a full inquiry under sub-rules (3) to (24) of Rule 14 must precede the order, so a minor penalty of that kind carries the whole major-penalty hearing. The procedural choice between the two tracks is covered in major vs minor penalty proceedings. A representation the authority ignores, or a finding that does not deal with the defence raised, is a breach of the Rule 16 hearing even though no oral inquiry was required.

The duty to give reasons

A disciplinary order must state its reasons, and those reasons must be the ones the authority actually relied on. The CCS (CCA) Rules require reasons at most stages: the inquiry report under Rule 14(23)(i)(d), the orders in a minor penalty case under Rule 16(2)(viii), the communication of the order with reasons for any disagreement or non-acceptance of UPSC advice under Rule 17, and the findings of the disciplinary authority on each article of charge under Rule 17. For the appellate order, Rule 27(2) lists what the appellate authority “shall consider”, and the duty to give reasons for its conclusion on each of those questions comes from Ram Chander.

Kranti Associates v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, decided on 8 September 2010, summarised the law in fifteen propositions at paragraph 51, beginning “In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.” Proposition (l) holds that “A pretence of reasons or ‘rubber-stamp reasons’ is not to be equated with a valid decision making process.” A speaking order therefore engages with the defence; one that recites the charge and states that it is proved does not.

Reasons cannot be supplied after the event. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, decided on 2 December 1977 by five judges, held that where a statutory functionary makes an order on certain grounds, “its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise”. For appellate orders, Ram Chander v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 103, quashed an order that mechanically reproduced the language of the rule, and Jagdish Sharan Varshney, (2009) 4 SCC 240, requires at least brief reasons even where the appellate authority affirms. The detail on the appeal, review and revision stages is in that article.

Exclusions: the second proviso, useless formality and post-decisional hearing

The hearing is excluded altogether in the three cases in the second proviso to Article 311(2), mirrored in Rule 19 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. Rule 19 applies notwithstanding Rules 14 to 18 where:

1. the penalty is imposed on the ground of conduct that has led to the servant’s conviction on a criminal charge;
2. the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry; or
3. the President is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry.

Tulsiram Patel held that where the proviso validly applies, audi alteram partem cannot be reintroduced “by a side-door to provide once again the same inquiry which the Constitutional provision has expressly prohibited”. The same judgment held that the written reason under clause (b) “is a condition precedent to the application of clause (b)”: without it, both the order dispensing with the inquiry and the penalty are void. The reason need not appear in the final order and need not be communicated, but it cannot be vague or a repetition of the words of clause (b). The first proviso to Rule 19 permits a representation on the penalty in a conviction case, and the second proviso keeps UPSC consultation and the servant’s right to answer that advice. The mechanics are in dispensing with inquiry.

Outside the second proviso, the courts recognise two narrower qualifications.

• Useless formality. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, decided on 28 August 2000, a laboratory assistant who overstayed leave abroad was deemed to have vacated his post under the University’s leave rules. The Court held that “on the admitted or undisputed facts, only one view was possible”, so the absence of notice caused no prejudice, while describing the useless formality theory as “an exception” whose reach beyond admitted facts is debated. The CCS (CCA) Rules have their own version for admitted charges: under Rule 14(5)(a), where the servant admits every article of charge in the written defence, the disciplinary authority records its findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it thinks fit, without appointing an inquiring authority.
• Post-decisional hearing. Maneka Gandhi held that the hearing “may be a hearing prior to the decision or it may even be a post-decisional remedial hearing”, and treated the Attorney General’s offer of a hearing as curing the impounding of a passport. The doctrine is rarely available in a disciplinary case, because Article 311(2) requires the inquiry before the penalty and not after it.

Suspension, probation and other decisions short of a penalty

Natural justice attaches to a penalty, and the question in each non-penal decision is whether it is in substance a penalty. Three decisions recur in central government service.

Suspension is not a penalty, and Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules prescribes no hearing before it. In Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, decided on 22 November 2013 in Civil Appeal No. 9454 of 2013, the Supreme Court held that suspension “cannot be treated as a punishment even by any stretch of imagination in strict legal sense” (paragraph 7) and that “Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings” (paragraph 14). State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, (1994) 4 SCC 126, held that the Tribunal was wrong to interfere with a suspension ordered after the authority considered the gravity of the alleged misconduct. The safeguards are structural. Rule 10(6) and 10(7) of the CCS (CCA) Rules require the order to be reviewed before 90 days, Rule 23(i) makes it appealable, and Rule 27(1) requires the appellate authority to consider whether it is justified. The pay consequences are in subsistence allowance and reinstatement.

A probationer can be discharged for unsuitability without an inquiry, but not for misconduct. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, (1999) 3 SCC 60, decided on 10 February 1999, the Court held that whether a termination is punitive “depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation”. Where findings of misconduct reached behind the probationer’s back are the foundation, the termination is a penalty and needs an Article 311(2) inquiry. The stigma “need not be contained in the order of termination but may also be contained in an order or proceeding referred to in the order of termination or in an annexure thereto”. The rules for probation in central government cover the ordinary discharge route.

Premature retirement in the public interest under Fundamental Rule 56(j) is not a penalty and is distinct from compulsory retirement under clause (vii) of Rule 11. Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada, (1992) 2 SCC 299, decided on 19 February 1992, held that no hearing is owed before it, while leaving the order open to challenge where the requisite opinion was not formed, where it rests on collateral grounds or no material, or where it is mala fide or arbitrary.

The prejudice test for a breach

A breach of natural justice does not automatically void a disciplinary order; the court asks whether the servant was denied any hearing, or only an adequate one, and in the second case whether the defect caused prejudice. State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, decided on 27 March 1996, drew the line between “no notice” or “no hearing” and “no adequate hearing”, “or to put it in different words, ’no opportunity’ and ’no adequate opportunity’”. A total denial voids the order. An inadequate hearing is tested for prejudice.

S.K. Sharma also sorted the rules themselves. An order passed in breach of the regulations “should not be set aside automatically”. The court first asks whether the provision is “of a substantive nature” or “procedural in character”. A substantive provision “has normally to be complied with” and the prejudice test does not apply to it. A procedural provision is tested for prejudice, except that for procedural provisions “of a fundamental character” the prejudice is treated as self-evident and the Court “may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases”. S.K. Sharma built on the approach Karunakar had set in 1993 for non-supply of the inquiry report, where the order falls only if the servant shows that the report, had it been supplied, could have made a difference.

The departmental appeal applies the same test. Rule 27(2)(a) of the CCS (CCA) Rules requires the appellate authority to consider whether the procedure in the rules was complied with “and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice”. The Central Administrative Tribunal, which under Section 22(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is itself guided by the principles of natural justice, reviews the decision-making process and not the merits. Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177, and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, confine it to breaches of procedure, findings on no evidence and penalties that shock the conscience; the scope of that review is set out in judicial review in service matters.

The usual relief is not an acquittal. Where a penalty falls for a procedural defect, Karunakar directs that the authority may resume the inquiry from the stage at which the defect arose, and where a court sets aside a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement on technical grounds and a further inquiry is ordered, Rule 10(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules deems the servant to have been under suspension from the date of the original order. The result is often a de novo inquiry from that stage, with the question of pay for the intervening period settled under Fundamental Rule 54-A.

Parallel codes for railway and All India Services officers

The principles are the same across services, but the rule numbers differ, and a pleading that cites the CCS (CCA) Rules for a railway servant or an IAS officer cites the wrong instrument. Members of the IAS, the IPS and the Indian Forest Service are proceeded against under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, where Rule 8 carries the major penalty inquiry and Rule 8(2) the appointment of the inquiring authority. Railway employees are governed by the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, where Rule 9 carries the inquiry and Rule 9(2) allows a Board of Inquiry.

The case law crosses the codes. Arjun Chaubey, the leading authority on a witness sitting as judge, arose under Rule 14(ii) of the railway rules; Kunj Behari Misra arose under Punjab National Bank’s service regulations; Saroj Kumar Sinha arose in Uttar Pradesh government service. Article 141 of the Constitution makes each binding on central government disciplinary authorities, and the principle each states does not depend on the wording of the rule it was decided under.

Related Articles

• Departmental inquiry
• Article 311
• CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
• Inquiry officer
• Presenting officer
• Defence assistant
• Charge sheet and articles of charge
• Inquiry report
• Disciplinary authority
• Ex parte inquiry
• De novo inquiry
• Dispensing with inquiry
• Major vs minor penalty proceedings
• Minor penalty
• Withholding of increment
• Dismissal and removal from service
• Reduction in rank
• Compulsory retirement
• Premature retirement
• Penalty proportionality
• Speaking order
• Appeal, review and revision under the CCS (CCA) Rules
• Central Administrative Tribunal
• Judicial review in service matters
• Suspension
• Subsistence allowance
• Reinstatement
• Probation in central government
• Sealed cover procedure
• Vigilance clearance
• Central Vigilance Commission
• Union Public Service Commission
• CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964
• Misconduct
• Railway employees
• All India Services
• Department of Personnel and Training
• Central government employees

External references

• Department of Personnel and Training: CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965
• Legislative Department: the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976
• Central Vigilance Commission: Vigilance Manual 2026
• Central Vigilance Commission: Master Circular No. 06/MC/2026 on CVC advice
• Supreme Court of India: judgments
• Legislative Department: the Constitution of India
• Central Administrative Tribunal

References

1. Constitution of India, Article 311(2) and its provisos, as amended by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 3 January 1977.
2. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rules 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23 and 27, Department of Personnel and Training compilation.
3. Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. DOPT-1711452233125 dated 26 March 2024, Handling of disciplinary proceedings in respect of central civilian employees, paragraph 4.
4. Central Vigilance Commission letter No. 99/VGL/66 dated 28 September 2000; Master Circular No. 06/MC/2026, No. 024/VGL/017-6 dated 27 July 2026; Vigilance Manual 2026, paragraphs 5.25.2 and 5.25.5.
5. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, 29 April 1969; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, 25 January 1978; Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300.
6. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, 11 July 1985; Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, 1 October 1993; State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, 27 March 1996.
7. Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 578, 23 March 1984; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611, 15 October 1987; State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, 2 February 2010.
8. Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84, 19 August 1998; Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739, 16 September 1999; Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, 19 December 2008.
9. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, 2 December 1977; Kranti Associates v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, 8 September 2010; Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, 28 August 2000.
10. Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, Civil Appeal No. 9454 of 2013, 22 November 2013; Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, (1999) 3 SCC 60, 10 February 1999; Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557, 12 March 2003.