Disproportionate Assets

Disproportionate assets is the charge that a public servant, or someone holding for that servant, possessed pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income during the period of office, without being able to satisfactorily account for the difference. Since 26 July 2018 it is prosecuted as intentional illicit enrichment under Section 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and departmentally it carries the mandatory removal or dismissal set by the first proviso to Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The charge is the one corruption case that needs no bribe giver, no trap and no identified official act. The prosecution builds it from arithmetic: what the servant owned at the start of a chosen check period, what the servant owned at its end, what the servant spent, and what the servant lawfully earned. The servant’s own immovable property returns under Rule 18 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 feed the asset figures, and Soundirarasu (2022) holds that the prosecution can rely on what the servant furnished under the service rules.

Four bodies of law govern a disproportionate assets case against a central government employee. The Prevention of Corruption Act sets the offence, the punishment of four to ten years under Section 13(2), and the investigation and sanction rules. A line of Supreme Court judgments from Krishnanand (1976) and Kaidalwar (1981) to Jayalalitha (2017) and Thommandru (2021) sets the method and the burden of proof. The Central Vigilance Commission, through its Master Circulars of 27 July 2026 and its Vigilance Manual 2026 published the same day, classifies the charge as one with an obvious vigilance angle. Pension and gratuity after a finding fall under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021.

This article sets out the statutory text before and after the 2018 amendment, the check-period computation with a worked example from the Supreme Court record, the 10% argument and why it fails, the burden on each side, the treatment of family members and income-tax returns, the departmental route, the pension consequences, and the questions the 2018 text has left open.

The offence in Section 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act

Section 13(1)(b) makes it criminal misconduct for a public servant “if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office”. The clause was inserted by Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (No. 16 of 2018), published in the Gazette of India on 26 July 2018 and brought into force on 26 July 2018, which substituted the whole of sub-section (1) of Section 13. The substituted sub-section has only two clauses: misappropriation in clause (a) and illicit enrichment in clause (b).

Explanation 1: the presumption

The words “disproportionate assets” do not appear in the operative clause. They appear in Explanation 1, which converts possession into a presumption of enrichment. A person “shall be presumed to have intentionally enriched himself illicitly” if he, or any person on his behalf, “is in possession of or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account for”.

Possession can be the servant’s own or that of “any person on his behalf”, which is how relatives and benamidars enter the case. Possession at any time during the period of office counts, so assets spent or transferred before a search still count. The closing words put the servant to an explanation once disproportion is shown.

Explanation 2: known sources of income

Explanation 2 now reads: the expression known sources of income “means income received from any lawful sources”. The definition it replaced, in the Explanation to the old Section 13(1)(e), had a second limb: income received from a lawful source “and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant”. The 2018 text drops that limb.

For a central government servant the intimation limb tied the criminal offence to the service rules. A gift above the Rule 13 limits, or a movable property transaction above two months’ basic pay under Rule 18(3) of the Conduct Rules, that was never reported could be excluded from known sources of income even if the money itself was lawful. Under Explanation 2 as it now stands, a lawful but unreported receipt is still a known source for the criminal offence; the failure to report remains a separate breach of the Conduct Rules.

Punishment, fine and repeat offence

Sources: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Sections 13(2), 14, 16 and 17 as amended by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Schedule, Part III) and the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (Sections 7, 8, 10 and 11), position on 2 October 2026.

The four-to-ten-year range dates from the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, which replaced “one year” with “four years” and “seven years” with “ten years” in Section 13(2). A consolidated text that still shows one to seven years predates that amendment and is stale.

How the offence developed from 1947 to 2018

The disproportionate assets offence has passed through three statutes, and the case law a lawyer cites today was mostly decided under the earlier two. Krishnanand (1976) and Kaidalwar (1981) were decided under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Nallammal (1999), Jayalalitha (2017), Thommandru (2021) and Soundirarasu (2022) construe Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, because the check periods in all four ended before 26 July 2018.

Sources: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as enacted (assent 9 September 1988, published 12 September 1988); Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, Section 7; R. Soundirarasu (5 September 2022), paragraphs 34 and 35, which quote the old Section 13(1)(e) and its Explanation and record that the Explanation had no counterpart in the 1947 Act.

The transition rule decides which definition applies. Soundirarasu (2022), paragraph 35, quotes Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 9 SCC 639, which held that applying Section 13 of the 1988 Act and its Explanation to a fact situation governed by the 1947 Act would offend Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, because the punishment and the Explanation were materially different. On the same reasoning a check period ending before 26 July 2018 is tested against Section 13(1)(e) and its intimation limb. How a check period straddling 26 July 2018 is divided between the two definitions is not addressed in Jagan M. Seshadri or Soundirarasu.

The check period and the disproportion formula

A disproportionate assets case is a computation over a fixed window called the check period: assets at its end, minus assets at its start, plus expenditure during it, minus income during it. The result, if positive and not satisfactorily explained, is the disproportion. Neither the Act nor any CVC circular prescribes the formula. The Supreme Court has reproduced it from the investigating agency’s own statements in the cases before it.

The clearest statement is in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, decided on 8 October 2021 by a Bench of D.Y. Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and B.V. Nagarathna JJ. Paragraph 5 sets out the CBI’s statement in six lines, labelled A to F, and footnote 13 describes line F as “Calculated by adding the Assets and Expenditure during the check period, and subtracting the Income from it.”

Worked example from Thommandru (2021)

Source: CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, Supreme Court, 8 October 2021, paragraph 5 and footnote 13. Arithmetic: 5,55,25,000 plus 40,33,322 is 5,95,58,322; minus 4,84,76,630 is 1,10,81,692; divided by 4,84,76,630 is 0.2286.

Expenditure is added because money spent during the period had to come from somewhere, so a servant who lived beyond declared means shows a disproportion even with no assets left at the end.

The percentage is computed on income. The High Court computation reproduced in Jayalalitha (2017) uses the same base: disproportionate assets multiplied by 100 and divided by income, which gave 8.12% in that case.

Disputes centre on the inputs. In Thommandru the Telangana High Court quashed the first information report on 11 February 2020, the accused having contested the CBI’s valuation of a construction at Rs. 5,15,50,000 against her own figure of Rs. 4,29,71,800 and an alleged double entry of Rs. 8,00,000 for a property sold during the period. Each such challenge moves line B or line E, and the percentage moves with it. The Supreme Court allowed the CBI’s appeal and set the High Court judgment aside.

Choice of check period

The investigating agency chooses the check period, and the Supreme Court cases show its range. In N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 17 SCC 83, the period ran from the servant’s joining on 2 November 1955 to 13 May 1986, the day before the case. In Jayalalitha (2017) it ran from 1 July 1991 to 30 April 1996, the term of office as Chief Minister. In Thommandru it ran from 1 April 2010 to 29 February 2016.

The CVC Master Circulars of 27 July 2026 on the vigilance angle and the role of the chief vigilance officer say nothing on how the period is chosen. Its opening date matters arithmetically: line A is subtracted from line B, so an asset already held on the opening date never enters the disproportion, while the same asset bought a day later is counted in full.

The 10% margin and Krishnanand (1976)

There is no percentage of disproportion below which the offence is not made out. Section 13(1)(b), Explanation 1, Explanation 2 and the old Section 13(1)(e) contain no threshold, and none appears in the CVC Master Circulars of 27 July 2026.

The 10% figure comes from Krishnanand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 816, decided on 17 December 1976 by A.C. Gupta, P.N. Bhagwati and P.N. Shinghal JJ. under the 1947 Act. The assets found were Rs. 55,732.25 against a surplus income of Rs. 44,383.59. The excess of Rs. 11,348.66 was about 8.9% of the total income of Rs. 1,27,715.43. In paragraph 33 the Court said that “since the excess is comparatively small”, being under a tenth of total income, it would not be right to hold the assets disproportionate so as to justify raising the presumption under Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act. The paragraph applies to the figures of that case and states no general margin.

The argument failed when it was tried at scale. In State of Karnataka v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha, (2017) 6 SCC 263, decided on 14 February 2017 by Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Amitava Roy JJ., the Karnataka High Court had acquitted on a disproportion of 8.12%, relying on Krishnanand. The Supreme Court held that the 8.12% figure “is based on completely wrong reading of the evidence on record compounded by incorrect arithmetical calculations”, that once disproportion was proved it was inessential to resort to arithmetic to compute a percentage, and that Krishnanand “has no application in the facts”. Jayalalitha distinguished Krishnanand; it did not overrule it.

For a central government servant a low percentage therefore works only as an argument that the prosecution’s valuations are too soft to prove disproportion at all. The immovable property return article reaches the same conclusion from the statutory text.

Burden of proof and the standard on the accused

The prosecution must prove disproportion objectively; only then does the burden shift to the accused, who discharges it on a preponderance of probability. The leading statement is State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199, decided on 6 May 1981 by A.P. Sen, O. Chinnappa Reddy and Baharul Islam JJ.

Kaidalwar lists four facts the prosecution proves:

1. that the accused is a public servant;
2. the nature and extent of the pecuniary resources or property found in the accused’s possession;
3. the known sources of income, which the Court defined as “sources known to the prosecution”;
4. that “it must prove quite objectively, that such resources or property found in possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known sources of income”.

The prosecution does not have to disprove every possible source the accused might later name. Once those four facts are proved, the accused must account for the disproportion, and the Court set the standard: “All that he need do is to bring out a preponderance of probability.” The accused is not required to prove innocence beyond reasonable doubt.

Later Benches described what the account must achieve. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691, decided on 18 November 2003, and again in N. Ramakrishnaiah (2008) at paragraph 16, the Supreme Court held that the legislature deliberately cast a burden on the accused “not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the Court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance”. A plausible story is not enough if the court does not accept it.

The accused has no right to give that explanation to the police first. K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655, paragraph 75, held that the investigating officer is required only to collect material and need not record the servant’s explanation in the charge sheet. Thommandru (2021) relied on Veeraswami to hold that a preliminary enquiry before registering a first information report is not mandatory in a disproportionate assets case, and R. Soundirarasu (2022), paragraphs 43 to 45, applied both.

What counts as a known source of income

A known source of income under Explanation 2 is income received from any lawful source; income from graft, crime or a windfall of unexplained origin does not qualify however openly it was received. Ramakrishnaiah (2008), paragraph 15, put it directly: “A receipt from windfall, or gains of graft, crime or immoral secretions by persons prima facie would not be receipt for the” known sources of income of a public servant.

R. Soundirarasu, decided on 5 September 2022 by Dinesh Maheshwari and J.B. Pardiwala JJ., separates two questions. Paragraph 42 holds that “known source of income” and “for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account” are different tests: the first is about where income came from, the second about whether the servant has explained the gap. Paragraph 41, construing the old Explanation, adds that “The prosecution can rely upon the information furnished by the accused to the authorities under law, rules and orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.” That is the evidential route by which the property returns, gift intimations and Rule 18 sanctions on the service file enter the trial.

Typical inputs, and the question each raises, are set out below. The classification of items in this table is a salary-calculator.in synthesis of the judgments cited in this section; it is not a list taken from any single source.

Income-tax returns and assessments

Filing a return and paying tax does not make a receipt lawful. In Jayalalitha (2017), as quoted in Thommandru (2021) paragraph 58 and Soundirarasu (2022) paragraph 46, the Supreme Court held that income-tax returns and orders “would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove the charge and can at best be pieces of evidence which have to be evaluated along with the other materials on record”. Thommandru also read Vishwanath Chaturvedi (3) v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 380, as holding that returns and assessments do not form a foolproof defence.

State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, decided on 6 January 2014, addressed the same question at the discharge stage: “The property in the name of an income tax assessee itself cannot be a ground to hold that it actually belongs to such an assessee.” The Court set aside the discharge orders and sent the case to trial. The tax position on lawful income is covered in income tax for government employees.

Assets held by family members and abetment

Relatives and associates who hold a public servant’s wealth can be prosecuted as abettors, and assets in their names count against the servant only where the evidence shows they are held on the servant’s behalf. Both halves come from the Supreme Court.

P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559, decided on 9 August 1999 by K.T. Thomas and M.B. Shah JJ., held: “There is no force in the contention that the offences under Section 13(1)(e) cannot be abetted by another person.” The Court gave three illustrations: a person who instigates the servant to acquire the wealth, a conspiracy to hold bribe money in relatives’ names, and a friend who agrees to hold the servant’s wealth in his own name. Jayalalitha (2017) applied Nallammal to convict the three private co-accused of abetment and criminal conspiracy, holding that the abatement of the appeal against the deceased public servant did not end the case against them. Abetment was charged under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code; the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 has since replaced the Code.

The limit comes from D.S.P., Chennai v. K. Inbasagaran, (2006) 1 SCC 420, decided on 7 December 2005 by B.N. Agrawal and A.K. Mathur JJ. The wife owned the cash, gave evidence herself, and had been assessed to income tax on it; the husband’s explanation was held plausible and the acquittal stood. On joint family property the Court held that unless there is categorical evidence, “it cannot be fastened on the husband or head of family”. Inbasagaran was decided after a full trial on the wife’s own evidence. Suresh Rajan (2014), decided at the discharge stage, holds that an assessee’s name on a title deed is not by itself enough. On this site’s reading the two judgments are reconciled by stage: Inbasagaran weighs proved evidence after trial, and Suresh Rajan forbids ending a case at the threshold on the title alone.

One question in this area is pending. On 7 May 2025, in P. Nallammal v. State (2025 INSC 643), a Bench of Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah JJ. differed on the final appeal against the wife’s abetment conviction and directed that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice of India. State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh (2026 INSC 272), decided on 20 March 2026, records that the two judges agreed on the point of law that non-public servants can abet the offence; the disagreement was on the facts.

Investigation, sanction and attachment

A Section 13(1)(b) case can be investigated only on the order of a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, and goes to a Special Judge only after sanction under Section 19. Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act sets the minimum investigating rank for every offence under the Act (Inspector in the Delhi Special Police Establishment, Assistant Commissioner of Police in the metropolitan areas, Deputy Superintendent of Police elsewhere), and its second proviso adds the Superintendent’s order for the illicit enrichment offence alone.

For officers on a Ministry’s Agreed List, paragraph 3.3.1(xiii)(d) of CVC Master Circular No. 02/MC/2026 dated 27 July 2026 provides for a secret enquiry by the CBI about their assets and financial resources, with the department making property returns and other records available. Prosecution needs the previous sanction for prosecution of the authority competent to remove the servant. Section 19 directs that authority to endeavour to convey its decision within three months, a period that may be extended by one month for reasons recorded in writing where legal consultation is needed; the procedure is in CVC Master Circular No. 05/MC/2026 of the same date.

Property can be frozen before trial. Section 18A, inserted in 2018, applies the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 to the attachment and confiscation of money or property procured through an offence under the Act, with the Special Judge in place of the District Judge. State statutes can go further: in Sudha Singh (2026) the Supreme Court held that confiscation under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 survives the death of the public servant.

The departmental side: vigilance angle, property returns and the charge

For the department, possession of disproportionate assets is an obvious vigilance case, policed through the annual property return and punished, if proved, by removal or dismissal. CVC Master Circular No. 01/MC/2026 dated 27 July 2026, “Definition of Vigilance Angle”, lists in paragraph 3.1 the misconduct in which a vigilance angle is obvious, and item (iv) is “Possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income.”

Detection starts with the returns. Paragraph 3.3.1(viii) of Master Circular No. 02/MC/2026 requires the chief vigilance officer of every organisation to scrutinise the immovable property returns or assets and liabilities statements “of a minimum of 20% of officials every year” and to take further action as required. Rule 18 of the Conduct Rules supplies the material: a return of assets and liabilities on first appointment under Rule 18(1)(i), the annual immovable property return under Rule 18(1)(ii) due by 31 January of the following year, and an intimation within one month of any movable property transaction above two months’ basic pay under Rule 18(3). Rule 18(4) lets the government call for a full statement of any movable or immovable property, including the means by which it was acquired. A criminal charge sheet filed in court, or a sanction for prosecution granted, also withholds vigilance clearance.

The charge and the inquiry

A departmental charge of disproportionate assets is drafted like any other article of charge. Paragraph 4.7.6 of the CVC Vigilance Manual 2026 states: “The rule which has been violated should be specified while drafting article of charge and the statement of imputations.” The charge sheet issues under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules and proceeds through a full departmental inquiry with an inquiry officer and a presenting officer.

Suspension

DoPT guidance lists disproportionate assets among the cases where suspension may be desirable. The DoPT consolidated OM No. DOPT-1711452233125 dated 26 March 2024, reproducing paragraph 4 of OM No. 11012/17/2013-Estt.(A) dated 2 January 2014, includes “possession of disproportionate assets” in clause (b) of that list. The same OM labels the list as for guidance and not mandatory. A servant under suspension draws subsistence allowance.

Mandatory removal or dismissal under Rule 11

The first proviso to Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 requires the penalty in clause (viii), removal, or clause (ix), dismissal, “in every case in which the charge of possession of assets disproportionate to known-sources of income or the charge of acceptance from any person of any gratification, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act is established”. The second proviso allows “in any exceptional case and for special reasons recorded in writing, any other penalty”. Compulsory retirement on a proved disproportionate assets charge therefore needs recorded special reasons.

B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, decided on 1 November 1995, was a disproportionate assets case. An Income-tax Officer charge-sheeted on 2 March 1982 was dismissed on 29 October 1986 after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission; the Tribunal converted the dismissal into compulsory retirement; the Supreme Court restored the dismissal. The limits on judicial interference with the quantum are covered under proportionality of penalty, and the distinction between the two penalties under dismissal and removal from service.

Parallel criminal and departmental proceedings

Paragraph 3.2(i) of the Vigilance Manual 2026 states that once the CBI takes up a case “a parallel investigation by departmental agencies should be avoided”, while the department “is not precluded from investigating the non-criminal misconducts”. Paragraph 4.7.6 adds that where the disciplinary authority proceeds on the same charges as a prosecution, the CBI may assess the possible effect and take the issue up with the competent authority. A conviction on a criminal charge also opens the separate route in Rule 19(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and Article 311(2)(a), under which the penalty may be imposed on the basis of the conduct that led to the conviction without a departmental inquiry.

Pension and gratuity after a finding of disproportionate assets

A finding of disproportionate assets during service, whether by a court or in a departmental inquiry, lets the President withhold or withdraw pension and gratuity under Rule 8(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021. The rule applies “if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement”. The cut may be full or partial, permanent or for a specified period.

Each order is bounded. The first proviso to Rule 8(1) requires the Union Public Service Commission to be consulted before any final order. The second proviso keeps the pension at or above the minimum fixed under Rule 44. The third limit is in the text of Rule 8(1) itself, which reaches misconduct “during the period of service”. Rule 7, headed future good conduct, separately lets the appointing authority act where a pensioner is convicted of a serious crime, in the light of the judgment of the court.

The money is held back while proceedings run. Rule 8(4)(a) provides for provisional pension to a servant who retires with departmental or judicial proceedings pending, and Rule 8(4)(c) states: “No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon.” Under the Explanation to Rule 8, judicial proceedings are deemed instituted on the date the complaint or police report of which the Magistrate takes cognizance is made. The mechanics of the cut are covered under withholding of pension and withholding and recovery from gratuity.

All India Services

Members of the IAS, IPS and Indian Forest Service face the same mandatory penalty under a different code. Rule 6(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 has a proviso that every case in which the charge of possession of assets disproportionate to known sources of income is established attracts the penalty in clause (viii) or (ix), removal or dismissal, and a further proviso allowing any other penalty “in any exceptional case, and for special reasons recorded in writing”. Property returns for All India Services officers are governed by rule 16 of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968, not by Rule 18 of the CCS Conduct Rules. The criminal offence under Section 13(1)(b) is the same for every public servant.

Common misconceptions

“Assets within 10% of income are safe.” No percentage appears in Section 13 or its Explanations. Krishnanand (1976) turned on an excess of about 8.9% on its own figures; Jayalalitha (2017) refused to apply it to an 8.12% figure that rested on errors.

“Paying income tax on the money proves it was lawful.” Jayalalitha (2017) holds that returns and assessments are evidence to be weighed with the rest of the record. Suresh Rajan (2014) adds that an assessee’s name on a property does not prove who owns it.

“The servant must be heard before the case is registered.” Thommandru (2021) holds that a preliminary enquiry is not mandatory in a disproportionate assets case, and Veeraswami (1991) holds that the investigating officer need not record the servant’s explanation before the charge sheet.

“A criminal investigation stops the departmental case.” Paragraph 3.2(i) of the Vigilance Manual 2026 advises against a parallel departmental investigation once the CBI has the case, but states that the department is not precluded from investigating non-criminal misconduct.

“Assets in the spouse’s name do not count.” They count where the evidence shows they are held on the servant’s behalf, and the spouse can be prosecuted as an abettor under Nallammal (1999). They do not count where, as in Inbasagaran (2006), the spouse proves independent ownership.

“Unreported income is never a known source.” That was true under the intimation limb of the old Explanation for check periods before 26 July 2018. Explanation 2 as substituted in 2018 defines known sources as income received from any lawful sources, without the intimation condition.

Points the 2018 text leaves to the courts

The leading judgments on disproportionate assets construe the pre-2018 Section 13(1)(e), and the 2018 text differs from it in two ways those judgments do not address. Section 13(1)(b) adds the word “intentionally”, which Section 13(1)(e) did not contain, while Explanation 1 makes intentional enrichment a presumption from disproportionate possession. Explanation 2 changed the definition of known sources of income on 26 July 2018, so a check period running across that date spans two definitions. A third point is case-specific: the reference to the Chief Justice of India in Nallammal (7 May 2025) concerns the facts of the wife’s abetment conviction, not the law on abetment.

The procedural statutes also changed. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Indian Penal Code and the Indian Evidence Act, as the foreword to the CVC Vigilance Manual 2026 records. Judgments citing Section 109 of the Penal Code for abetment or Section 106 of the Evidence Act for facts within the accused’s knowledge should be read against the corresponding provisions of the new codes.

Related Articles

• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
• Immovable property return
• CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964
• CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965
• Charge sheet and articles of charge
• Central Vigilance Commission
• Chief vigilance officer
• Vigilance angle
• Vigilance clearance
• Central Bureau of Investigation
• Sanction for prosecution
• Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
• Dismissal and removal from service
• Compulsory retirement
• Proportionality of penalty
• Major and minor penalty proceedings
• Minor penalty
• Misconduct
• Departmental inquiry
• Inquiry officer
• Presenting officer
• Disciplinary authority
• Suspension
• Subsistence allowance
• Article 311
• Principles of natural justice
• Appeal, review and revision under the CCS (CCA) Rules
• Central Administrative Tribunal
• Union Public Service Commission
• CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021
• Withholding of pension
• Withholding and recovery from gratuity
• Provisional pension
• All India Services
• All India Services (Conduct) Rules
• All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules
• Income tax for government employees

External references

• Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, Gazette of India, 26 July 2018
• CVC Vigilance Manual 2026
• Central Vigilance Commission
• CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, Department of Personnel and Training
• CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, Pensioners’ Portal
• Central Bureau of Investigation
• India Code

References

1. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (No. 49 of 1988), Sections 13(1)(b), 13(2), 14, 16, 17, 18A and 19, as amended by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Schedule, Part III) and the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (No. 16 of 2018, Gazette of India, 26 July 2018), Sections 7 to 13.
2. Krishnanand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 816, Supreme Court, 17 December 1976, paragraph 33.
3. State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199, Supreme Court, 6 May 1981.
4. P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559, Supreme Court, 9 August 1999; and P. Nallammal v. State, 2025 INSC 643, 7 May 2025.
5. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691, Supreme Court, 18 November 2003; N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 17 SCC 83, 17 October 2008, paragraphs 15 and 16.
6. D.S.P., Chennai v. K. Inbasagaran, (2006) 1 SCC 420, Supreme Court, 7 December 2005; State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, 6 January 2014.
7. State of Karnataka v. Selvi J. Jayalalitha, (2017) 6 SCC 263, Supreme Court, 14 February 2017.
8. CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, Supreme Court, 8 October 2021, paragraphs 5, 29 and 58; State v. R. Soundirarasu, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1452 to 1453 of 2022, Supreme Court, 5 September 2022, paragraphs 34 to 46.
9. Central Vigilance Commission, Master Circular No. 01/MC/2026 (Definition of Vigilance Angle), paragraph 3.1(iv), and Master Circular No. 02/MC/2026 (Role of the CVO), paragraphs 3.3.1(viii) and 3.3.1(xiii)(d), both dated 27 July 2026; Vigilance Manual 2026, paragraphs 3.2(i) and 4.7.6.
10. CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, Rule 11, first and second provisos; All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, rule 6(1), provisos; CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021 (G.S.R. 868(E), 20 December 2021), Rules 7 and 8; DoPT consolidated OM No. DOPT-1711452233125 dated 26 March 2024.