Central Vigilance Commission

The Central Vigilance Commission is the statutory body that exercises superintendence over the vigilance administration of the central government, advises disciplinary authorities on cases of corruption against public servants, and exercises superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation so far as its work relates to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It was set up by Government Resolution No. 24/7/64-AVD dated 11 February 1964 and given statutory footing by the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, to which the President assented on 11 September 2003.

For a central government employee the Commission is not an abstraction. It enters a disciplinary case twice, at defined points, and what it says at each of them shapes the outcome. Before any charge sheet issues in a case with a vigilance angle, the Commission tenders first stage advice on whether the matter is fit for prosecution, for major penalty proceedings, for minor penalty proceedings, for administrative action, or for closure. After the departmental inquiry concludes, it tenders second stage advice, but only where the disciplinary authority proposes to depart from what it said the first time.

Neither piece of advice binds. Section 17(3) of the 2003 Act requires the authority to consider the advice and take appropriate action, and requires a disagreement to be recorded in writing and communicated back. The enforcement is reputational: the Commission’s annual report carries a chapter naming the organisations that diluted or ignored its advice, case by case, with the outcome of each.

This page covers the Commission’s origin in the Santhanam Committee and the Supreme Court’s directions in Vineet Narain, the composition, tenure, removal and pay of its members, the functions listed in Section 8(1) and the classes of public servant listed in Section 8(2), the mechanics of first and second stage advice, the split superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation, the interface with the Lokpal, the Chief Vigilance Officer network through which the Commission actually works, and the caseload recorded in the Annual Report 2025.

How the Commission acquired a statute

The Commission spent its first 34 years resting on an executive resolution, and acquired a statute only because the Supreme Court ordered one. Government Resolution No. 24/7/64-AVD dated 11 February 1964 constituted it, on the recommendation of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption chaired by K. Santhanam. A resolution can be withdrawn by another resolution, which was the defect the Court addressed.

In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1998 (1) SCC 226, decided on 18 December 1997 in Writ Petitions 340 to 343 of 1993, the Supreme Court directed in terms that the Commission “shall be given statutory status”, that selection of the Central Vigilance Commissioner “shall be made by a Committee comprising the Prime Minister, Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition”, and that the Commission “shall be entrusted with the responsibility of superintendence over the CBI’s functioning”. The same set of directions required the Commission to review the progress of all cases moved by the agency for sanction of prosecution that were pending with competent authorities, “specially those in which sanction has been delayed or refused”, and fixed a minimum tenure of two years for the Director of the agency regardless of the date of superannuation.

The legislative response took five years and ran through three ordinances. Paragraph 1.1.6(i) of the Vigilance Manual 2026 records the chain: statutory status with effect from 25 August 1998 through the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1998, then the Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Ordinance dated 27 October 1998, then a further ordinance dated 8 January 1999, then DoPT Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD-III dated 4 April 1999 and a resolution of even number dated 13 August 2002, each holding the position while the Bill was before Parliament.

The Act itself, No. 45 of 2003, has no commencement clause at all. Section 1 reads only that the Act may be called the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, so it took effect on the date of assent, 11 September 2003. The continuity with everything that went before is achieved instead by deeming: Section 3(1) deems the Commission constituted under the 1999 Ordinance and continued under the two DoPT Resolutions to be the Commission constituted under the Act, Section 3(5) carries across the office holders and the Secretary with their terms intact, Section 24 transfers the actions, proceedings, employees, assets and liabilities of the 1964 Resolution body, and Section 27 repeals the 1999 Resolution while saving what was done under it.

Composition, appointment and tenure

Section 3(2) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 provides for a Central Vigilance Commissioner as Chairperson and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners as Members. Three is therefore the ceiling, not a fixed strength, and the Commission has functioned below it for long stretches.

Section 3(3) defines two eligibility pools. The first covers persons who have been or are in an All India Service, in any civil service of the Union or in a civil post under the Union, with knowledge and experience of vigilance, policy making and administration including police administration. The second covers persons who have held or hold office in a corporation established by or under a Central Act or in a government company owned or controlled by the Central Government, together with persons having expertise and experience in finance including insurance and banking, in law, and in vigilance and investigations. The proviso caps either pool at two of the three seats, which prevents an all-bureaucrat and an all-banker Commission alike.

Appointment is by the President under Section 4(1), by warrant under hand and seal, after obtaining the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister as Chairperson, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People. The Explanation to that sub-section extends “Leader of the Opposition” to the leader of the single largest opposition group where none has been recognised, and Section 4(2) provides that no appointment is invalid merely because of a vacancy in the committee. The Secretary to the Commission is appointed separately by the Central Government under Section 3(4), and the headquarters is at New Delhi under Section 3(6).

Section 5(1) fixes the term at four years from the date of entering office or the age of 65, whichever is earlier, and bars reappointment in the Commission afterwards. Section 5(2) applies the same limits to a Vigilance Commissioner, with two provisos: a Vigilance Commissioner may be appointed Central Vigilance Commissioner, and the aggregate service in both capacities may not exceed four years. Section 5(3) requires an oath before the President in the form set out in the Schedule, and Section 5(4) allows resignation in writing to the President.

The bar on later employment in Section 5(6) is wider than a simple cooling-off period. A former Central Vigilance Commissioner or Vigilance Commissioner is ineligible for any diplomatic assignment, for appointment as administrator of a Union territory, for any other assignment or appointment required by law to be made by the President by warrant under hand and seal, and for further employment to any office of profit under the Government of India or a State Government.

Who is in office

The office of Central Vigilance Commissioner is vacant as at 22 September 2026. Shri Praveen Kumar Srivastava, who was a Vigilance Commissioner from August 2022 and Central Vigilance Commissioner from December 2022, demitted office on 2 August 2026. Shri A. S. Rajeev, formerly Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of Maharashtra, was appointed Vigilance Commissioner by the President on 9 February 2024 and joined on 11 March 2024; the President has authorised him to act as Central Vigilance Commissioner with effect from 3 August 2026. That authorisation is the arrangement Section 10(1) provides for on a vacancy arising by death, resignation or otherwise. The other serving Vigilance Commissioner is Shri Praveen Vashista, an Indian Police Service officer of the 1991 batch from the Bihar cadre, appointed on 12 December 2025 and in office from 16 January 2026.

Pay of the Commissioners, and the deduction that follows a pensioner

Section 5(7) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 states no rupee figure. It makes the salary, allowances and other conditions of service of the Central Vigilance Commissioner the same as those of the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission, and those of a Vigilance Commissioner the same as those of a Member of that Commission. The figure has to be traced through the UPSC chain: regulation 4 of the Union Public Service Commission (Members) Regulations, 1969, as substituted in 2007, pays the UPSC Chairman a salary equal to the Chief Election Commissioner and a UPSC Member a salary equal to an Election Commissioner, and Section 10(1) of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 pays both of those the salary of a Judge of the Supreme Court, Rs. 2,50,000 a month. On the UPSC side the two figures converge, which is why the UPSC Chairman and a Member both draw Rs. 2,50,000 and the widely quoted Rs. 2,25,000 for a Member is the High Court judge row read across.

No Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners (Salaries and Allowances) Rules exist. The Commission’s own document register carries its Staff Rules of 2007 and the Staff Amendment Rules of 2017, and nothing on the salaries of the members themselves. Any rupee figure quoted for these two offices is therefore the UPSC figure read across under Section 5(7), and a source that states one without naming that chain has not shown its working.

Three provisos govern what a retired appointee actually receives. The first reduces the salary by the amount of any pension, other than a disability or wound pension, for previous service under the Union or a State, and it reaches the commuted portion and the pension equivalent of other forms of retirement benefit, excluding only the pension equivalent of retirement gratuity, so commutation shelters nothing. The second applies the same reduction to a person in receipt of retirement benefits from a corporation established under a Central Act or a government company, which is the limb that bites on an appointee drawn from the Section 3(3)(b) pool. The third protects the holder in office, since salary, allowances, pension and other conditions of service may not be varied to the holder’s disadvantage after appointment.

Section 13 charges the salaries, allowances and pensions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, the Vigilance Commissioners, the Secretary and the staff on the Consolidated Fund of India. Charged expenditure is not voted by Parliament, which is the same funding protection that Article 322 of the Constitution gives the UPSC.

Removal

Removal for misbehaviour requires the Supreme Court. Section 6(1) permits the President to remove a Central Vigilance Commissioner or a Vigilance Commissioner on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity only after the Supreme Court, on a reference made by the President, has held an inquiry and reported that the holder ought on that ground to be removed. Section 6(2) allows the President to suspend the holder pending orders on that report, and to prohibit attendance at the office during the inquiry if that is considered necessary.

Section 6(3) is a separate summary route that needs no reference to the Court. The President may remove the holder who is adjudged an insolvent, has been convicted of an offence which in the opinion of the Central Government involves moral turpitude, engages during the term of office in any paid employment outside the duties of the office, is in the President’s opinion unfit to continue by reason of infirmity of mind or body, or has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially the functions of the office. Section 6(4) deems an interest in a government contract or agreement to be misbehaviour for the purposes of Section 6(1), with an exception for an interest held as a member and in common with other members of an incorporated company.

The structure is closely modelled on Article 317 of the Constitution, which governs a UPSC member, and the practical effect is the same: the holder cannot be removed by the government that appointed him acting alone.

What the Commission does: Section 8(1)

Section 8(1) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 lists eight functions, and they fall into three groups: policing the police, inquiring into corruption, and advising.

Two provisos limit the first and the last. The proviso to clauses (a) and (b) bars the Commission, while exercising superintendence or giving directions, from requiring the establishment to investigate or dispose of any case in a particular manner. The proviso to clause (h) bars it from giving directions on policy matters. Between them they mark the boundary the Commission is not allowed to cross: it may supervise the system and advise on the case, and it may not decide the case or make the policy.

Clause (g) carries the words “or otherwise” after the list of bodies that may refer a matter, which is the textual basis on which the Commission advises without waiting for a reference, and it is the clause the Commission itself cites at paragraph 4.1 of the Annual Report 2025 when explaining the advisory function.

Whose conduct the Commission can inquire into: Section 8(2)

Section 8(2)(a) covers members of the All India Services serving in connection with the affairs of the Union and Group A officers of the Central Government. That is the core jurisdiction, and it is fixed by the statute rather than by notification.

Section 8(2)(b) leaves the public sector to the Central Government to notify, with a proviso that until a notification issues every officer of the bodies concerned is treated as falling within the Section 8(1)(d) complaint limb. Two notifications have issued. S.O. 371(E) dated 18 March 2004, File No. 418/2/2004-AVD. IV, brought in all officers of Scale V and above of all public sector banks. S.O. 1538(E) dated 12 September 2007, under the same file number, set the levels for the rest:

The last row carries a trap. The Rs. 8,700 figure is a 2007 threshold expressed on the pre-6th Central Pay Commission scales, and the notification itself qualifies it as the salary on the central government dearness allowance pattern “as on the date of the notification and as may be revised from time to time”. No later notification revising it appears in the Commission’s register of instruments under Section 8(2), so the figure should never be quoted as a current cut-off without that qualification.

Section 8(2)(c), inserted by Section 58 and the Schedule of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 with effect from 16 January 2014, extends the reach downwards but only through the Lokpal. On a reference made under the proviso to Section 20(1) of that Act, the Section 8(1)(d) category also includes members of Group B, Group C and Group D services of the Central Government, and such officials of central corporations, companies, societies and local authorities as the Central Government may notify, with every official deemed covered until a notification issues.

Where the Commission enters a disciplinary case

A CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 proceeding against a central government employee runs through the disciplinary authority, and the Commission sits beside it rather than above it. The entry points are fixed by executive instruction and by the Commission’s own circulars, not by the 1965 Rules, which do not mention the Commission at all.

First stage advice comes before the charge sheet. Paragraph 2.31 of the Annual Report 2025 records that Chief Vigilance Officers take up the enquiry in appropriate cases and, where a vigilance angle emerges, seek the first stage advice of the Commission, and that the same route applies where an inspection or audit throws up misconduct with a vigilance angle. Paragraph 1.18 lists what the advice can say: initiation of criminal proceedings, regular departmental action, administrative action, or closure of the case, with regular departmental action meaning a penalty specified in the service rules of the organisation concerned. Office Memorandum No. 425/04/2012-AVD-IV(A) dated 29 November 2012 allows one month from receipt of the investigation report to seek that advice, one month to put the case to the disciplinary authority afterwards, and a week to issue the charge sheet.

Second stage advice comes after the inquiry report, and since 2014 it has been the exception. Commission circular No. 08/12/14 dated 3 December 2014, restated at paragraph 1.20 of the Annual Report 2025, provides that where the disciplinary authority on conclusion of the proceedings proposes a penalty in line with the first stage advice, the Commission need not be consulted again; the case is dealt with at the level of the Chief Vigilance Officer and the disciplinary authority, and the Chief Vigilance Officer forwards an action taken report with a copy of the final order for the Commission’s record. Where the authority proposes anything at variance with the first stage advice, the case must go back for second stage advice. The figures show how sharply that filters: 1,905 first stage advices in 2025 against 271 at the second stage.

Where the Union Public Service Commission is in the loop, the Commission drops out of the second stage entirely. Paragraph 1.19 of the Annual Report 2025 states that in disciplinary cases involving Group A officers of the Central Government, members of the All India Services and other categories where the original order imposing a penalty is to be issued by the President and the UPSC must be consulted under the rules, the Central Vigilance Commission need not be consulted for second stage advice on conclusion of the proceedings. The senior officer therefore gets one external check rather than two, and it is the constitutional body that supplies it.

At appeal, the position reverses. Where the UPSC is not to be consulted, a case in which the Commission was consulted earlier goes back to it if the appellate or revising authority proposes to modify or set aside the penalty, a rule the Vigilance Manual carries and the appeal, review and revision machinery follows.

What happens when the advice is not accepted

Section 17 sets the mechanism. Section 17(1) requires the report of an inquiry undertaken by any agency on a reference by the Commission to be forwarded to the Commission. Section 17(2) requires the Commission, after considering the report and any other relevant factors, to advise the Central Government or the body concerned as to the further course of action. Section 17(3) then requires that government or body to consider the advice and take appropriate action, with a proviso that an authority which does not agree shall record its reasons in writing and communicate them to the Commission.

The Act attaches no consequence to a breach. What the Commission does instead is publish. Chapter 4 of the Annual Report 2025, headed non-compliance of Commission’s advice and other areas of concern, opens at paragraph 4.1 by noting that acceptance of the Commission’s reasoned advice in an overwhelming majority of cases is an indication of its objectivity, and then records that in some cases the prescribed consultation mechanism was not adhered to, the authorities did not accept the advice, or the advice was “substantially diluted without approaching the Commission for reconsideration of its advice, as per extant procedure”. Paragraph 4.2 lists the significant instances organisation by organisation, beginning with the Ministry of Railways, each entry closing on an outcome line such as the imposition of a minor penalty where the Commission advised otherwise.

For an employee facing proceedings, the practical reading is that a disciplinary authority which departs from the advice in the employee’s favour is doing something lawful that will be named in a document laid before Parliament. Section 14 requires the Commission to present its report to the President within six months of the close of the year, requires a separate part on the functioning of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, and requires the President to cause the report to be laid before each House.

The Chief Vigilance Officer network

The Commission has no field staff, and works through the Chief Vigilance Officer of each organisation. Paragraph 3.5 of the Annual Report 2025 puts it plainly: the officer constitutes the link between the organisation and the Commission, and the Commission communicates primarily with that officer while tendering advice and seeking reports and clarifications.

Appointment is split across three authorities. Of the 190 full-time posts recorded at paragraph 3.7, appointment to 153 is made by the Department of Personnel and Training under its Office Memorandum No. 372/7/2016-AVD-III dated 28 April 2017, after obtaining the Commission’s view on suitability; the operative DoPT order is now Office Memorandum No. 40/1/2022-EO(CVO) dated 18 November 2022, which consolidates the 2017 guidelines with the later pay clarifications. Posts in public sector banks, insurance companies and financial institutions are filled by the Department of Financial Services in the Ministry of Finance, and those in the New Delhi Municipal Council, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and the Delhi Transport Corporation by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Paragraph 3.8 records that the Central Board of Direct Taxes, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, the Department of Posts and the Ministry of Railways carry encadred full-time posts, and that part-time officers are approved by the Commission from a panel proposed by the organisation under its notice No. 022-CVO-08 dated 21 March 2022.

Paragraph 2.9 of the Vigilance Manual 2026 fixes the tenure at three years in an organisation, extendable by two, subject to the overall limit on central deputation, with a further three years available on lateral transfer to another organisation with the Commission’s prior concurrence. An officer who has served as Chief Vigilance Officer in an organisation may not be considered for the same post in that organisation for another term. Paragraph 2.11 routes a short-term additional charge arrangement of up to a year through the Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, and anything beyond a year through the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, in both cases with the Commission’s concurrence.

The scale of that work in one year: the Commission approved the suitability of 198 officers for Chief Vigilance Officer posts during 2025, cleared 12 as full-time officers, agreed 60 proposals for additional charge, and approved 169 officers for part-time appointment.

Superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation

Superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation is split by subject matter. Section 4(1) of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, as substituted by Section 26(b) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, vests superintendence in the Commission so far as it relates to investigation of offences alleged to have been committed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Section 4(2) leaves superintendence in all other matters with the Central Government, and Section 4(3) vests administration of the establishment in its Director. The Commission therefore supervises the corruption docket and nothing else, and even there the proviso to Section 8(1)(a) and (b) forbids it from requiring a case to be investigated or disposed of in a particular manner.

The Commission’s role in selecting the Director lasted a decade. Section 4A as substituted in 2003 put the Central Vigilance Commissioner in the chair of the selection committee, with the Vigilance Commissioners, the Secretary (Home Affairs) and the Secretary (Coordination and Public Grievances) in the Cabinet Secretariat as members. Section 58 and the Schedule of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 substituted that sub-section with a committee of the Prime Minister as Chairperson, the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People, and the Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court nominated by him, and omitted the sub-section requiring the outgoing Director’s views to be taken into account. The Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2014, Act 28 of 2014, then provided that the leader of the single largest opposition party sits where there is no recognised Leader of the Opposition, and inserted a new Section 4A(2) under which a vacancy or absence on the committee does not invalidate an appointment. The two-year minimum tenure the Supreme Court had directed survives at Section 4B(1), together with the bar in Section 4B(2) on transferring the Director without the previous consent of the committee. Provisos added by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2021, Act 45 of 2021, deemed in force from 14 November 2021, allow that term to be extended on the committee’s recommendation by up to one year at a time, to a maximum of five years in total.

What the Commission retained, and what it gained, are both worth naming. It retained the Section 4C committee that recommends appointments at the level of Superintendent of Police and above, chaired by the Central Vigilance Commissioner with the Vigilance Commissioners, the Home Secretary and the Secretary (Personnel), and required to consult the Director before recommending. It gained, under the new Section 4BA, the recommendation of the Director of Prosecution, who heads the Directorate of Prosecution at not below the rank of Joint Secretary for a term of not less than two years.

The single directive and its successor

Section 6A, inserted into the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act by Section 26(c) of the 2003 Act, barred the agency from inquiring into a Prevention of Corruption Act offence against a central government employee of the level of Joint Secretary and above without the previous approval of the Central Government. A Constitution Bench struck it down in Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI, decided on 6 May 2014, holding at paragraph 98 that Section 6A(1) “is invalid and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution” and that, as a necessary corollary, Section 26(c) of Act 45 of 2003 was to that extent also declared invalid.

Parliament restored a protection of the same shape four years later at a different address. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, introduced by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 dated 26 July 2018, requires the previous approval of the competent authority before any enquiry, inquiry or investigation into an offence under that Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant. Paragraph 4.9.1 of the Vigilance Manual 2026 states the purpose as protecting honest public servants from unnecessary or frivolous investigation of decisions taken in the discharge of official functions, and paragraph 4.9.3 names the operating instrument as DoPT letter No. 428/07/2021-AVD.IV(B) dated 3 September 2021, carrying the standard operating procedure for processing Section 17A cases.

The Lokpal interface

The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 did not replace the Commission; it gave the Commission a second client. Under the first proviso to Section 20(1) of that Act, where the Lokpal decides to proceed with a preliminary inquiry it may, by general or special order, refer complaints against public servants of Group A, B, C or D to the Commission. For Group A and Group B the Commission reports back to the Lokpal under Section 20(2) and (4). For Group C and Group D it proceeds under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, which is what Sections 8A and 8B, both inserted with effect from 16 January 2014, provide for.

Those two sections give the Commission the only hard deadlines in the Act. Section 8A(2) requires the preliminary inquiry to be completed ordinarily within 90 days, extendable by a further 90 days for reasons recorded in writing, from the date of receipt of the complaint. Section 8A(1) then allows the Commission, on a prima facie finding and after giving the public servant an opportunity of being heard, to cause an investigation by an agency or by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, to initiate disciplinary or other action through the competent authority, or to close the proceedings and proceed against the complainant under Section 46 of the Lokpal Act. Section 8B(1) allows six months for the investigation, extendable by six, and Section 8B(3) allows the Commission to decide on filing a charge sheet or a closure report before the Special Court. Section 11A, inserted at the same time, creates a Director of Inquiry not below the rank of Joint Secretary, appointed by the Central Government, to conduct the preliminary inquiries the Lokpal refers.

Where the Lokpal has referred a matter, its superintendence displaces the Commission’s. Section 25(1) of the Lokpal Act gives the Lokpal powers of superintendence over, and direction to, the Delhi Special Police Establishment in matters referred by it, notwithstanding Section 4 of the 1946 Act and Section 8 of the 2003 Act, and Section 25(2) requires the Commission to send the Lokpal a statement on action taken on the referred complaints at such intervals as the Lokpal directs.

The Enforcement Directorate appointment

Section 25 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 has nothing to do with the Central Bureau of Investigation. It provides that the Director of Enforcement is appointed by the Central Government on the recommendation of a committee chaired by the Central Vigilance Commissioner, with the Vigilance Commissioners, the Secretary (Home), the Secretary (Personnel) and the Secretary (Revenue) as members. That committee survived the Lokpal amendments untouched, so the Commission lost its role in the selection of one agency head and kept it for the other.

Section 25(d) was amended by the Central Vigilance Commission (Amendment) Act, 2021, Act 46 of 2021, which the Commission’s own consolidated text footnotes as taking effect from 14 November 2021. The provisos it added allow the initial tenure of the Director of Enforcement to be extended in the public interest, on the recommendation of the same committee and for reasons recorded in writing, by up to one year at a time, and bar any extension after the completion of five years in total including the initial appointment.

Whistle-blower complaints

The Commission receives whistle-blower complaints under an executive resolution, not under the Act that was written for the purpose. The Public Interest Disclosure and Protection of Informers Resolution, 2004 is the operative instrument, as partly amended by DoPT Notification No. 371/4/2013-AVD.III dated 14 August 2013, which authorises the Chief Vigilance Officer of a ministry or department to act as the designated authority to receive a written complaint or disclosure alleging corruption or misuse of office, and authorises the Commission to supervise and monitor the complaints those designated authorities receive. The Commission recorded 2,544 such complaints received during 2025 and 2,539 disposed.

The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 names the Commission as a competent authority at Section 3, but Section 1(3) makes the Act commence on a date the Central Government appoints by notification, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions. That the Commission continues to run its whistle-blower work under the 2004 Resolution is the best available indication of where that stands.

The Commission’s year in numbers

The Annual Report 2025, presented under Section 14 and uploaded to the Commission’s site on 24 August 2026, is the current report. Its figures are the most direct answer to what the Commission actually does.

The disposal figures reveal what most of the complaint traffic is. Of the 35,193 complaints disposed, 20,063 concerned officials outside the Commission’s jurisdiction or were grievances forwarded for necessary action, 13,181 were filed as vague or unverifiable, and 1,701 were filed as anonymous or pseudonymous. That leaves 248 sent for inquiry or investigation, which is 0.7% of the complaints disposed.

The first stage advice breakdown is the figure an employee under investigation should read. Of the 4,626 officers covered, closure was advised for 1,651, administrative action for 1,203, major penalty proceedings for 987, minor penalty proceedings for 617, and prosecution for 168. Closure and administrative action together account for 2,854, so a majority of the officers reaching the Commission at the first stage do not face a formal penalty proceeding at all.

Against that, sanction for prosecution remains the slow limb. Organisations dealt with 934 cases during 2025, accorded 602 sanctions, denied 116, and carried 216 into the following year. Reviewing the progress of exactly those pending applications is the function Section 8(1)(f) assigns the Commission, and it is the function the Supreme Court singled out in 1997.

Powers, procedure and the limits of the Act

Section 9 governs the Commission’s own proceedings. Business is transacted at the headquarters, the Commission regulates its own procedure and allocation of business by unanimous decision, business is transacted unanimously as far as possible and by majority where the members differ, the senior-most Vigilance Commissioner presides in the absence of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, and no act or proceeding is invalid merely by reason of a vacancy, a defect in the constitution of the Commission, a defect in an appointment, or an irregularity of procedure not affecting the merits.

Section 11 gives the Commission the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while conducting an inquiry: summoning and enforcing attendance from any part of India and examining on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning public records, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents, and any other prescribed matter. The section attaches those powers to “clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section 8”, which is an oddity worth stating rather than smoothing over: clause (b) is the power to give directions to the Delhi Special Police Establishment, which is not an inquiry at all, while the clause (d) complaint inquiry, the Commission’s principal inquiry limb, is not named. The 2003 Gazette text and the Commission’s current consolidated text read alike on this, so it is the Act’s wording and not a transcription slip.

Section 12 deems the Commission a civil court for Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and deems its proceedings judicial within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of Section 196 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 16 deems the members, the Secretary and the staff to be public servants within Section 21 of that Code. Both sections still refer to the 1973 Code and the 1860 Penal Code in the Commission’s consolidated text as it stands in 2026, with no footnote recording a substitution for the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita or the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

Section 15 protects the Commission, its members, the Secretary and the staff against any suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding for anything done or intended to be done in good faith under the Act. Section 18 lets the Commission call for reports, returns and statements from the Central Government and the bodies within its reach to enable general supervision of vigilance and anti-corruption work.

Section 19 is the provision most often overlooked, and it works in the employee’s direction. The Central Government must consult the Commission in making any rules or regulations governing vigilance or disciplinary matters for persons appointed to public services and posts under the Union or for members of the All India Services. Section 20 gives the Central Government rule-making power, Section 21 gives the Commission power to make regulations with the previous approval of the Central Government, and Section 22 requires every notification under Section 8(2)(b), and every rule and regulation, to be laid before each House for thirty days.

What the Commission is not

The Commission does not investigate. It causes investigations to be conducted, by the Delhi Special Police Establishment or by the organisation’s own machinery, and the Commissioners for Departmental Inquiries attached to it conduct inquiries as inquiry officers in cases entrusted to them. It does not impose penalties: every penalty in a central government disciplinary case is imposed by the disciplinary authority under Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, and the Commission’s name appears nowhere in the penalty order.

It does not decide policy in the organisations it supervises, because the proviso to Section 8(1)(h) forbids directions on policy matters. It does not direct the outcome of a criminal investigation, because the proviso to Section 8(1)(a) and (b) forbids requiring a case to be investigated or disposed of in a particular manner. It does not select the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation, a role it lost on 16 January 2014. And it does not bind the disciplinary authority, because Section 17(3) asks only for consideration and a recorded reason for departure.

The Commission is also a public authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005, operates an RTI cell, and reports its RTI disposal in the annual report, which is worth knowing for an employee seeking the record in a case that passed through it. Vigilance Awareness Week, observed from 27 October 2025 to 2 November 2025 in the most recent cycle on the theme of vigilance as a shared responsibility, coincides with the birth anniversary of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on 31 October.

Related Articles

• CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
• CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964
• All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968
• Departmental inquiry
• Preliminary inquiry
• Charge sheet and articles of charge
• Major versus minor penalty proceedings
• Disciplinary authority
• Inquiry officer
• Presenting officer
• Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries
• Appeal, review and revision under the CCS (CCA) Rules
• Censure
• Reduction in rank
• Dismissal and removal from service
• Suspension
• Sealed cover procedure
• Vigilance clearance
• Chief Vigilance Officer
• Central Bureau of Investigation
• Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
• Sanction for prosecution
• Disproportionate assets
• Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
• Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014
• Right to Information Act, 2005
• Immovable property return
• Department of Personnel and Training
• Union Public Service Commission
• Central Secretariat Service
• Central government employees in India
• Article 311 of the Constitution
• Article 309 of the Constitution
• Central Administrative Tribunal
• Promotion
• Premature retirement
• Withholding of pension
• CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021

External references

• Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, consolidated text with amendment footnotes: cvc.gov.in
• Central Vigilance Commission, Annual Report 2025: cvc.gov.in
• Central Vigilance Commission, Vigilance Manual 2026 (large file, about 63 MB): cvc.gov.in
• Central Vigilance Commission, Vigilance Manual, updated 2021: cvc.gov.in
• Notification S.O. 371(E) dated 18 March 2004 on public sector bank officers: cvc.gov.in
• Notification S.O. 1538(E) dated 12 September 2007 on jurisdiction under Section 8(2)(b): cvc.gov.in
• Central Vigilance Commission: cvc.gov.in
• Lokpal of India: lokpal.gov.in

References

1. Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (Act 45 of 2003), assented 11 September 2003, Sections 3 to 27, read in the Commission’s consolidated text carrying the amendment footnotes.
2. Government of India Resolution No. 24/7/64-AVD dated 11 February 1964, constituting the Central Vigilance Commission on the recommendation of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption.
3. Vineet Narain and Others v. Union of India and Another, 1998 (1) SCC 226, decided 18 December 1997 in Writ Petitions 340 to 343 of 1993.
4. Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, Supreme Court of India, Constitution Bench, decided 6 May 2014, paragraph 98.
5. Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, Sections 4, 4A, 4B, 4BA and 4C, as substituted by Section 26 of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 and amended by Section 58 and the Schedule of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 with effect from 16 January 2014.
6. Central Vigilance Commission, Annual Report 2025, paragraphs 1.16 to 1.20, 2.14, 2.17, 2.19, 2.31, 2.40, 3.5 to 3.9 and 4.1 to 4.2, and Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 2.7 and 3.7.
7. Central Vigilance Commission, Vigilance Manual 2026, dated 27 July 2026, paragraphs 1.1.6(i), 2.9, 2.11 and 4.9.
8. Notification S.O. 371(E) dated 18 March 2004 and Notification S.O. 1538(E) dated 12 September 2007, Department of Personnel and Training, File No. 418/2/2004-AVD. IV, under Section 8(2)(b) of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
9. Central Vigilance Commission circular No. 08/12/14 dated 3 December 2014, on dispensing with second stage advice where the proposed penalty accords with the first stage advice.
10. Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 425/04/2012-AVD-IV(A) dated 29 November 2012 (model time limits) and Office Memorandum No. 372/7/2016-AVD-III dated 28 April 2017 (appointment of Chief Vigilance Officers), consolidated with the 2019 and 2021 pay clarifications into Office Memorandum No. 40/1/2022-EO(CVO) dated 18 November 2022.