Central Administrative Tribunal

The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) is the statutory forum of first instance for service disputes of central government employees, constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act No. 13 of 1985), which received assent on 27 February 1985 and was brought into force for the Tribunal on 1 July 1985 by notification G.S.R. 527(E). The Tribunal began functioning on 1 November 1985, with its Principal Bench at New Delhi and benches at Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.

Parliament created the Tribunal under Article 323-A of the Constitution, which Section 46 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 inserted as part of a new Part XIV-A. The design was to lift service litigation out of the ordinary civil courts and the High Courts altogether and to place it before a specialist body. On establishment the Tribunal received 13,350 cases transferred to it from the High Courts and subordinate courts under Section 29 of the Act. It now sits in 19 benches holding 35 courts, and it had received 9,88,738 cases and disposed of 9,19,157 of them as on 31 January 2026, leaving 69,581 pending.

That original design did not survive intact. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, a bench of seven judges held on 18 March 1997 that the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts by Articles 226 and 227 and in the Supreme Court by Article 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be excluded. Every decision of the Tribunal is therefore open to challenge before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the bench falls. What survived was the Tribunal’s position as the court of first instance: a central government servant may not bypass it and file a writ petition in the High Court in the first place.

This article sets out the constitutional and statutory origin of the Tribunal, the definition of a service matter in Section 3(q) and the reach of its jurisdiction under Section 14, the three categories of persons that Section 2 puts outside the Act, the requirement in Section 20 to exhaust departmental remedies and the limitation periods in Section 21 that follow from it, the mechanics of filing under the Procedure Rules of 1987, the timelines and the consequences of non-appearance, the review of the Tribunal’s own order, the powers the Tribunal exercises and the ones it does not, the narrow scope of its review of a disciplinary penalty, the route from a Tribunal order onward, and the composition of its benches after the Supreme Court struck down the appointment provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 in November 2025.

Departmental appeal, Tribunal and High Court compared

A central government servant who wants a service order undone passes through three forums in a fixed order: the departmental appeal under Rule 23 of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, the Central Administrative Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and a writ petition to a Division Bench of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227. The order is not a matter of choice. Section 20 of the Act keeps the servant at the departmental stage until it is exhausted, and L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 keeps him at the Tribunal before the High Court.

The narrowing at each step is the point worth carrying forward. The appellate authority under Rule 27(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules may confirm, enhance, reduce or set aside the penalty on the merits, and is the last forum that can. The Tribunal, from the moment the departmental appeal is decided or six months pass without a decision, is confined to judicial review.

Constitutional and statutory origin

The Tribunal rests on Article 323-A of the Constitution, inserted by Section 46 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, and on the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 that Parliament enacted under it. The Act received assent on 27 February 1985, was brought into force on 1 July 1985 by notification G.S.R. 527(E), and the Tribunal began functioning on 1 November 1985.

Article 323-A and the 42nd Amendment

Article 323-A(1) empowers Parliament alone to provide by law for the adjudication by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints about recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts. The asymmetry with Article 323-B, which empowers “the appropriate Legislature”, is the reason State Administrative Tribunals are created under the central Act on a State’s request under Section 4(2) rather than by State legislation.

Article 323-A(2)(d) permitted such a law to exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 in respect of the disputes referred to in clause (1). Article 323-A(3) gave the whole article overriding effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of the Constitution. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 took up that permission and barred every court other than the Supreme Court, and Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, from exercising jurisdiction over matters within the Tribunal’s remit.

The Supreme Court upheld that scheme in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124, decided on 9 December 1986 by a Constitution Bench of five judges, on the theory that the Tribunal was an equally efficacious alternative mechanism to the High Court. That theory was held to be erroneous eleven years later. The Act itself survived; only the exclusion of judicial review fell.

Enactment and commencement

Section 1(3) left the commencement of the provisions relating to the Central Administrative Tribunal to a notification, and the appointed day was fixed as 1 July 1985 by G.S.R. 527(E) of that date, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3(i). The gap between assent on 27 February 1985 and the appointed day is why the Act is sometimes said to have taken effect in mid-1985 and sometimes at the beginning of November. The Tribunal opened for business on 1 November 1985, and several amendments made by Act 19 of 1986 were given retrospective effect from that date.

Two later changes are worth recording. The long title was amended by Act 19 of 1986 with effect from 22 January 1986 to bring in corporations and societies owned or controlled by Government. Section 1(2)(b), which had extended the Act to Jammu and Kashmir with modifications, was omitted by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 (Act 34 of 2019) with effect from 31 October 2019, so the Act now extends to the whole of India without qualification, and the Tribunal has benches at Jammu and at Srinagar.

Jurisdiction

Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 gives the Central Administrative Tribunal every power that the civil courts and the High Courts held immediately before 1 November 1985 over recruitment and service matters of All-India Service members, of persons appointed to any civil service or civil post under the Union, and of civilians appointed to defence services or posts connected with defence. Section 3(q) defines what a service matter is, Section 14(2) extends the jurisdiction to notified bodies, and Section 2 names the three categories of persons the Act does not reach at all.

What counts as a service matter

Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 defines a service matter as all matters relating to the conditions of a person’s service in connection with the affairs of the Union, of any State, of any local or other authority within India or under the control of the Government of India, or of any government-owned or controlled corporation or society, as respects five heads: remuneration including allowances, pension and other retirement benefits; tenure, including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation; leave of any kind; disciplinary matters; and any other matter whatsoever.

The fifth head does the work that the first four cannot. Because Section 3(q)(v) is a residuary clause, the four specific heads illustrate rather than limit, and a grievance that fits none of them is still a service matter if it concerns a condition of service. A dispute about pay fixation, a denied annual increment, a sealed cover, seniority in a promotion list, a refused leave application, a premature retirement order under FR 56(j) or the calculation of a pension all fall inside the definition.

Section 3(r) defines the companion term. Service rules as to redressal of grievances means the rules, regulations, orders, instruments or arrangements in force for the redressal, otherwise than under this Act, of grievances in relation to such matters. That definition is what Sections 20 and 21 attach to, so the remedies a servant must exhaust before coming to the Tribunal are the ones his own service rules provide, and nothing wider.

The three heads of Section 14

Section 14(1) provides that, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, the Tribunal shall exercise on and from the appointed day all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts except the Supreme Court in relation to three heads.

The first, in clause (a), is recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any All-India Service, to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union, or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being in either case a post filled by a civilian.

The second, in clause (b), is all service matters concerning a member of any All-India Service; a person appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil post under the Union; and a civilian appointed to any defence service or a post connected with defence.

The third, in clause (c), covers service matters of a person whose services have been placed by a State Government, a local authority, a corporation or a society at the disposal of the Central Government for appointment to a post falling within clause (b). An Explanation inserted by Act 19 of 1986 with effect from 1 November 1985 provides that references to the Union include references to a Union territory.

The reach of clause (a) is worth separating from clause (b). Clause (b) is about persons already appointed; clause (a) is about recruitment, and so covers candidates who never entered service at all. A challenge to a selection, to the rejection of a candidature, or to the conduct of a recruitment examination for a Union civil post falls within Section 14 even though the applicant is not a government servant.

Bodies notified under Section 14(2)

An employee of a government company, an autonomous body or a society reaches the Tribunal only if his organisation has been notified, and 229 organisations have been. Section 14(2) allows the Central Government to apply the Act by notification to local and other authorities within India or under the control of the Government of India, and to corporations and societies owned or controlled by Government, other than those owned or controlled by a State Government. Section 14(3) then extends the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to recruitment and service matters of the notified body, from the date the notification specifies, and the proviso to Section 14(2) allows different dates for different classes of such bodies. The Department of Personnel and Training records in paragraph 14.9 of its Annual Report 2024-25 that the provisions of the Act have been extended to 229 organisations so far. The Principal Bench additionally handles matters of the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

Two consequences follow for a reader working out whether he can file. An employee of a body that has never been notified has no forum under this Act at all, and litigates in the ordinary civil court or under Article 226. An employee of a State-owned corporation is outside Section 14(2) by its own terms, whatever the Central Government does, and belongs before the State Administrative Tribunal where one exists.

Persons outside the Act

Section 2 places three categories beyond the Act. Clause (a) covers any member of the naval, military or air forces or of any other armed forces of the Union. Clause (c) covers any officer or servant of the Supreme Court or of any High Court or courts subordinate thereto, the last five words having been inserted by Act 51 of 1987 with effect from 22 December 1987, which makes the exclusion wider than it is usually stated to be: staff of a district court are outside the Tribunal, not merely staff of the High Court. Clause (d) covers persons appointed to the secretarial staff of either House of Parliament, of a State Legislature or a House of it, or of a Union territory Legislature.

The count is three and not four, though the lettering runs to (d). Clause (b) as originally enacted was omitted by Section 3 of the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 19 of 1986) with effect from 1 November 1985, which is the day the Tribunal opened, so no applicant has ever been excluded by it. The India Code text prints the gap as a row of asterisks between clauses (a) and (c).

Service disputes of armed forces personnel go to the Armed Forces Tribunal constituted under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (Act No. 55 of 2007), which received assent on 25 December 2007. Whether personnel of the central armed police forces fall within the words “any other armed forces of the Union” in Section 2(a) has been contested, and the position is not settled; the phrase itself has generated more litigation than the rest of Section 2 put together.

State and joint tribunals

Section 15 creates the mirror of Section 14 for the State Administrative Tribunals, covering State civil services and civil posts under a State, and Section 15(4) removes any doubt by providing that a State tribunal’s jurisdiction does not extend to a matter within the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Section 16 provides that a Joint Administrative Tribunal for two or more States exercises all the jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunals of those States. A State Administrative Tribunal is set up under the central Act on the request of the State Government, not by State legislation, and Section 4(2) is the provision the Central Government acts under on receiving that request.

Five States have an approved tribunal, and one of the five does not function. The Department of Personnel and Training lists Karnataka, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Kerala and Haryana in paragraph 14.6 of its Annual Report 2024-25, recording Haryana as non-functional. A State employee in any other State therefore has no administrative tribunal at all and litigates his service matter before the High Court. Section 4(5), inserted later, allows the Central Government with a State’s concurrence to designate members of a State tribunal’s benches as members of the Central Administrative Tribunal’s benches for that State, and the reverse on a State’s request, which is how the two structures share members where both exist.

Exhaustion of departmental remedies

Section 20(1) provides that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless the applicant has availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules. The word “ordinarily” is doing real work: the bar is discretionary, unlike the limitation bar in Section 21, which is mandatory subject only to condonation.

Section 20(2) then defines exhaustion in two ways. A person is deemed to have availed of all remedies where a final order has been made by the Government or other authority rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made in connection with the grievance; or where, having preferred an appeal or made a representation, he has not received a final order and a period of six months has expired from the date on which the appeal was preferred or the representation was made.

Section 20(3) removes one remedy from the count. A remedy by way of a memorial to the President or to the Governor, or to any other functionary, is not deemed to be one of the remedies available unless the applicant elected to submit it. A servant who has filed a departmental appeal under Rule 23 of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 is not required to petition the President as well before coming to the Tribunal.

This is the point at which the departmental appeal machinery and the Tribunal interlock. The CCS (CCA) Rules set no time limit within which an appellate authority must decide an appeal, so Section 20(2)(b) supplies the practical one: six months after the appeal is preferred, the servant is treated as having exhausted the remedy whether or not the appellate authority has acted, and the clock under Section 21 starts.

One consequence of filing at the Tribunal deserves weighing before the application goes in. Section 19(4) provides that where an application is admitted, any appeal or representation on the same grievance pending before an authority immediately before the admission abates. The departmental appeal does not run in parallel; admission extinguishes it.

Limitation under Section 21

The limitation period is one year, and it runs from one of two starting points depending on how the departmental remedy ended. Section 21(1)(a) bars the Tribunal from admitting an application, in a case where a final order of the kind mentioned in Section 20(2)(a) has been made, unless the application is made within one year from the date on which that final order was made.

Section 21(1)(b) covers the other case. Where an appeal or representation of the kind mentioned in Section 20(2)(b) was made and six months expired without a final order, the application must be made within one year from the date of expiry of that six-month period. The outer limit in this second case is therefore eighteen months from the date the appeal was preferred, made up of the six-month waiting period and the year that follows it. A common misreading treats the six months as the deadline itself.

Section 21(2) is a transitional provision and is spent for ordinary applicants. It applied where the grievance arose from an order made in the three years immediately preceding the date on which the Tribunal’s jurisdiction became exercisable in respect of the matter, and where no proceedings had been commenced before a High Court by that date; in such a case the application could be filed within the Section 21(1) period or within six months from that date, whichever expired later. The phrase “whichever period expires later” appears only here.

Section 21(3) is the condonation provision. Notwithstanding Section 21(1) or Section 21(2), an application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within that period.

The Supreme Court returned to the interaction of Sections 20 and 21 in The Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 INSC 565, decided on 24 April 2025. The judgment holds that limitation genuinely applies to proceedings under the 1985 Act, unlike the writ jurisdiction where delay is a discretionary bar; that Sections 20(2) and 21 refer to remedies expressly provided under the relevant service rules, so a self-initiated representation for which the rules make no provision cannot postpone limitation or manufacture a fresh cause of action; and that where the service rules provide no remedy against a final order, the applicant comes directly to the Tribunal. Repeated representations against a stale order do not revive it.

Filing an application

An original application costs Rs. 50, is made in Form I under Rule 4 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, and goes to the Registrar of the bench where the applicant is posted or where the cause of action arose. The applicant may present it in person, so no lawyer is required at any stage.

Form, place and fee

An application is made in Form I, in triplicate, to the Registrar of the bench with jurisdiction, on payment of Rs. 50. The instrument that fixes all three is the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, notified by G.S.R. 17(E) dated 6 January 1987 under clauses (d), (e) and (f) of Section 35(2) and clause (c) of Section 36 of the Act, in supersession of the 1985 Procedure Rules, and in force from 15 January 1987. There are 33 rules and four forms in Appendix A.

Rule 4 requires every application under Section 19 to be made in Form I, filed in triplicate in two compilations: the first carrying the application and the order complained against, the second carrying the remaining documents and annexures in paper-book form. The application may be presented in person, by an agent or by a duly authorised legal practitioner to the Registrar, or sent by registered post with acknowledgement due. Persons with a common interest may apply jointly, and an association may apply provided at least one affected person joins it.

Rule 6 fixes the place of filing. The application goes ordinarily to the Registrar of the bench within whose jurisdiction the applicant is currently posted, or within whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or partly arose. A person who has ceased to be in service by retirement, dismissal or termination may file where he ordinarily resides at the time of filing, which matters to a pensioner who has retired and moved away from the office of last posting.

Rule 7 prescribes a fee of Rs. 50, paid by crossed demand draft on a nationalised bank in favour of the Registrar of the bench, or by crossed Indian Postal Order. The same figure applies to a permitted joint application. Where the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant cannot pay the fee on the ground of indigence, it may exempt him. Rule 11 adds a fee of Rs. 5 for each respondent in excess of five. Section 19(2) of the Act caps the prescribed filing fee at one hundred rupees, so the fee under the Rules sits at half the statutory ceiling.

Rule 8 requires grounds to be stated concisely under distinct heads and consecutively numbered, and provides that no separate application is needed for an interim order already prayed for in the main application. A request for condonation of delay must be made by a separate application supported by an affidavit. Rule 9 governs documents, which are annexed and marked A-1, A-2 and so on, with an attested true copy of the impugned order. Rule 10 confines an application to one cause of action, allowing several reliefs only where they are consequential to one another. Rule 12 gives the respondent one month from service of notice to file a reply in triplicate, verified as a written statement under Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with documents marked R-1, R-2 and so on. Rule 12(6) allows the Tribunal to permit an amendment of pleadings in the same manner as Order VI Rule 17 of the Code.

Rule 5 governs what happens between presentation and registration. The Registrar endorses the date of presentation, registers and numbers the application if it is in order, and otherwise requires the defect to be cured, in his presence for a formal defect and within a stipulated time for anything else, with a postal filing to be informed of the defect. Where the defect is not rectified the Registrar may decline registration by a reasoned written order and place the matter before the bench, so a refusal at the counter is itself a recorded decision rather than an informal rejection.

The language of the Tribunal is English, and Hindi is admitted in three specific ways. Rule 3(1) states the general position, with a proviso allowing parties to file documents drawn up in Hindi, a further proviso allowing a bench in its discretion to permit the use of Hindi in the proceedings and to direct English translations of pleadings and documents, and a clause allowing a bench to make final orders in either language. Rule 3(2) requires that where a final order is made in Hindi, an authenticated English translation is prepared simultaneously and kept on record.

Admission and summary rejection

Section 19(1) permits a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to a matter within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to make an application, and the Explanation defines “order” to include an order made by the Government, a local or other authority, a Government-owned or controlled corporation or society, or an officer, committee, body or agency of any of them.

Section 19(3) requires the Tribunal, on receipt of an application and if satisfied after such inquiry as it deems necessary that it is a fit case for adjudication or trial, to admit the application. Where it is not so satisfied, it may summarily reject the application, but only after recording its reasons. A summary rejection without reasons is therefore itself vulnerable, on the same principle that governs a speaking order in departmental proceedings.

Timelines after registration

Rule 14(2) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 requires every application to be heard and decided, as far as possible, within six months from the date of its registration. Rule 14(1) requires each bench to draw up a calendar for the hearing of transferred cases and to decide them according to it as far as possible, and Rule 14(3) gives the Tribunal power to decline an adjournment and to limit the time for oral arguments. The words “as far as possible” make the six-month norm directory, and the pendency figures below show what the benches actually absorb.

The intermediate dates are shorter and firmer. Rule 12(1) gives each contesting respondent one month from service of notice to file the reply and documents in triplicate. Rule 29 lets the Registrar grant up to thirty days for a reply or rejoinder before placing the matter before the bench, so an extension beyond that is a judicial and not a registry decision. Rule 13 requires the date and place of hearing to be notified to the parties in the manner the Chairman directs by general or special order. Rule 19 allows time and an adjournment at any stage for sufficient cause, and lets the Tribunal make such order as it thinks fit about the costs occasioned by the adjournment, which is the only head of costs the Rules address.

Two administrative rules complete the picture for anyone filing in person. Rule 26 keeps the office open from 9.30 a.m. to 6 p.m. except on Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays, subject to the Chairman’s orders. Rule 27 fixes ordinary sitting hours of 10.30 a.m. to 1.30 p.m. and 2.30 p.m. to 5 p.m.

Non-appearance, default and ex parte orders

A dismissal for default can be undone within thirty days; a decision on merits cannot. Rule 15(1) gives the Tribunal the discretion, where the applicant does not appear on the date fixed for hearing or on any date to which it is adjourned, either to dismiss the application for default or to hear and decide it on merits. Rule 15(2) then allows the applicant who was dismissed for default to apply within thirty days of the dismissal, and on satisfying the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance, to have the dismissal set aside and the application restored. The proviso to Rule 15(2) shuts the alternative: where the case was disposed of on merits, the decision cannot be reopened except by way of review.

Rule 16 runs the same machinery in the respondent’s direction. Where the applicant appears and the respondent does not, the Tribunal may adjourn or hear and decide the application ex parte. Rule 16(2), as substituted by G.S.R. 557(E) dated 4 September 1991, lets that respondent apply within 30 days of the order to have it set aside on showing that notice was not duly served or that sufficient cause prevented his appearance, and the Tribunal may then set the order aside on such terms as it thinks fit and appoint a fresh date. Where an ex parte order cannot be set aside against one respondent alone it may be set aside against all or any of the others. The second proviso is the exception: in a case where the Tribunal proceeded under Rule 11(8) because serving every respondent was not reasonably practicable, the ex parte order will not be set aside merely because a respondent was not served.

Review by the Tribunal of its own order

The Tribunal can review its own order, and the window is thirty days from receipt of a copy of it. The power is statutory: Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 gives the Tribunal the same power as a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of reviewing its decisions, which is why no general principle needs to be invoked to justify it. Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 supplies the mechanics.

Four limits in Rule 17 decide most review applications. Rule 17(1) bars a review filed later than thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Rule 17(2) sends it ordinarily to the same bench that passed the order, unless the Chairman, for reasons recorded in writing, directs another bench to hear it. Rule 17(3) has it disposed of by circulation unless the bench orders otherwise, and the bench may either dismiss it or direct notice to the opposite party, so a review is not automatically heard in open court. Rule 17(4) permits one review only: once an application for review of a judgment or order has been made and disposed of, no further review application is entertained in the same matter. Rule 17(5) requires the review application to be supported by a duly sworn affidavit indicating the source of knowledge, and requires the counter-affidavit to be sworn likewise wherever a factual averment is disputed.

The review is not an appeal and does not extend the time for moving the High Court, which is a writ jurisdiction with no statutory period but a discretionary bar on delay. A servant who has lost on merits and wants the findings re-examined is in the judicial review route to a Division Bench, not in Rule 17.

Death of a party and substitution

Where a party dies during the pendency of proceedings, the legal representatives have ninety days to apply to be brought on record, and the proceedings against the deceased abate if they do not. Rule 18(1) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 fixes the ninety days, and Rule 18(2) provides for the abatement, with a proviso allowing the Tribunal on an application to set aside the order of abatement and substitute the legal representatives for good and sufficient reasons.

Rule 2(f) defines the person who may step in, and the definition is wider than the ordinary law of succession. A legal representative means a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased, and includes a person or persons in whom the right to receive pensionary, retirement, terminal or other benefits or family pension vests. A widow drawing family pension is therefore entitled to be substituted and to carry the application to its conclusion, which matters where the claim is for arrears of pay, a revised pension calculation or retirement gratuity withheld at retirement.

Powers and procedure of the Tribunal

Section 22(1) provides that a Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, and gives it power to regulate its own procedure, including the fixing of places and times of inquiry and the decision whether to sit in public or in private. Section 22(2) requires it to decide every application as expeditiously as possible, ordinarily on a perusal of documents and written representations and after hearing such oral arguments as may be advanced.

Section 22(3) then confers on the Tribunal the same powers as a civil court under the Code while trying a suit, in respect of nine matters: summoning and enforcing attendance and examining a person on oath; requiring the discovery and production of documents; receiving evidence on affidavits; requisitioning any public record or document, subject to Sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; reviewing its decisions; dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex parte; setting aside such a dismissal or ex parte order; and any other prescribed matter. Clause (f) is where the review jurisdiction comes from, and Rule 17 of the Procedure Rules supplies its thirty-day limit and its one-review ceiling.

Section 23 gives the applicant the choice to appear in person or to take the assistance of a legal practitioner. The Government or authority may authorise legal practitioners or its own officers to act as presenting officers, which mirrors the presenting-officer role in a departmental inquiry under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules.

Section 24 controls interim orders. No interim order by way of injunction, stay or otherwise may be made unless copies of the application and of all documents in support of the plea are furnished to the party against whom the order is made or proposed, and that party is given an opportunity of being heard. The proviso allows the Tribunal to dispense with both requirements as an exceptional measure, for reasons recorded in writing, where it is necessary to prevent a loss to the applicant that cannot adequately be compensated in money. An ex parte interim order made under the proviso ceases to have effect on the expiry of fourteen days from the date it is made, unless the requirements are complied with within that period and the Tribunal continues the order.

Section 25 gives the Chairman power to transfer any case pending before one bench to any other bench, on the application of a party after notice and hearing, or on his own motion without notice. Section 26 provides for decision by majority, and where the members are equally divided, for reference of the point to the Chairman, who hears it himself or refers it to one or more other members; the point is then decided according to the majority of all the members who have heard the case, including those who first heard it. Section 18 empowers the appropriate Government to distribute business among benches by notification, and makes the Chairman’s decision final on whether a matter falls within a bench’s allocated business.

Section 30 makes proceedings before the Tribunal judicial proceedings within Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 31 makes the Chairman, members and staff public servants within Section 21 of that Code, Section 32 protects action taken in good faith, and Section 33 gives the Act overriding effect.

Scope of review of a disciplinary penalty

The Tribunal will set aside a disciplinary proceeding for a breach of procedure or for a finding resting on no evidence, but it may not reappreciate the evidence and may not substitute its own view on the quantum of penalty. Disciplinary proceedings are the largest single class of applications before it, and three decisions of the Supreme Court set the boundaries.

In Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177, decided on 14 March 1989, the Court held that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in disciplinary matters cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. It may not interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer or of the disciplinary authority where those findings are not arbitrary or utterly perverse, and it has no power to substitute its own discretion on the quantum of penalty, because the Tribunal may exercise only such powers as the civil court or the High Court could have exercised in judicial review, neither less nor more.

In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, decided on 1 November 1995 by a three-judge bench, the Court held that judicial review is directed at the manner in which the decision was made and not at its correctness; that the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts; and that where the conclusion rests on evidence the Tribunal cannot reappreciate it, the only question being whether the finding is based on evidence on the record or on no evidence. Where the penalty shocks the conscience, the court or tribunal will mould relief, normally by directing the authority to reconsider the penalty, and only in exceptional and rare cases will it substitute a penalty itself in order to shorten the litigation.

In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, decided on 27 August 1997, the Court placed penalty proportionality within the Wednesbury framework for administrative matters that do not involve fundamental freedoms. The court’s role in such cases is secondary: interference on the ground of irrationality requires a finding that no sensible person could have reached the decision on the material, or that the punishment is in outrageous defiance of logic. Proportionality as a primary standard of review is confined to cases involving fundamental freedoms and discrimination.

What follows from this line is a practical division. The Tribunal will set aside a proceeding for breach of natural justice, for denial of documents or of a defence assistant, for a charge sheet that does not disclose the imputation, for bias, for a finding resting on no evidence, or for want of jurisdiction in the disciplinary authority. It will not reweigh the evidence, and on quantum it will ordinarily remit the matter to the disciplinary or appellate authority rather than fix the penalty itself. Where it remits, the authority reconsiders under Rule 27(2)(c) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which asks whether the penalty is adequate, inadequate or severe. Where the proceeding itself is set aside for a procedural defect, the outcome is often a de novo inquiry from the stage at which the defect occurred rather than an acquittal.

L. Chandra Kumar and the route to the High Court

Every order of the Tribunal is open to a writ petition before a Division Bench of the High Court, because the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court cannot be excluded by statute. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, was decided on 18 March 1997 by a bench of seven judges, A.M. Ahmadi CJI writing. The concluding paragraph declares that Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226, 227 and 32, are unconstitutional, and that Section 28 of the Act and the exclusion-of-jurisdiction clauses in all other legislation enacted under Articles 323-A and 323-B are unconstitutional to the same extent. The jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 is part of the inviolable basic structure.

Four consequences follow, and they define the litigation path for every central government servant.

All decisions of the Tribunal are subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the concerned tribunal falls. The remedy is a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227, not a statutory appeal, and it does not lie before a single judge.

No appeal from a decision of the Tribunal lies directly before the Supreme Court under Article 136. The aggrieved party moves the High Court first, and from the decision of the Division Bench may move the Supreme Court under Article 136 by special leave.

The Tribunal continues to act as a court of first instance in the areas of law for which it was constituted. It is not open to a litigant to approach the High Court directly, by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, even in a case questioning the vires of a statutory provision. The Tribunal is itself competent to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules.

The single exception is a challenge to the legislation that creates the tribunal. A tribunal cannot pronounce on the constitutionality of its own parent Act, so a challenge to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 goes directly to the High Court.

Neither Article 323-A(2)(d) nor Section 28 was repealed. Both remain printed, and both are void only so far as they purport to oust the writ jurisdiction. The same reasoning governs the finality clause in Section 27, which on its own terms says that a final order of the Tribunal shall not be called in question in any court including a High Court.

L. Chandra Kumar also read Section 5(6) down rather than striking it. Where a question involving the interpretation of a statutory provision or rule in relation to the Constitution arises before a single-member bench, the proviso to Section 5(6) operates automatically and the matter must be referred to a bench of at least two members, one of whom must be a judicial member. On that reading Section 5(6) is valid. The Court also recorded its dissatisfaction with the working of tribunals and recommended that they be placed under a single nodal ministry, preferably the Ministry of Law and Justice.

Enforcement of an order

Section 27 provides that a final order of the Tribunal shall be executed in the same manner in which a final order of the nature referred to in Section 20(2)(a) would have been executed, whether or not such a final order had actually been made. The order is enforced as though it were the departmental order disposing of the appeal or representation, which places the obligation on the same administrative machinery that would have implemented a favourable appellate order.

Where an authority does not comply, the enforcement route is contempt. Section 17 gives the Tribunal the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has and may exercise, and applies the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 subject to two modifications: references to a High Court include the Tribunal, and the reference to the Advocate-General in Section 15 of that Act means, in relation to the Central Administrative Tribunal, the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General or an Additional Solicitor-General.

Benches, composition and appointment

A bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal consists of one judicial member and one administrative member under Section 5(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and the sanctioned strength across the 19 benches is 70 members including the Chairperson, of whom 35 are judicial and 35 administrative. Appointment, qualifications and tenure are governed by Supreme Court directions rather than by a current statute, because the Court struck down the operative provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 on 19 November 2025.

Benches

The Tribunal has 19 regular benches holding 35 courts between them, and 11 of those benches also hold circuit sittings at 21 places. Section 5(7) names New Delhi as the seat of the Principal Bench and Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras and New Bombay as the other ordinary seats, with such other places as the Central Government may notify, and the rest were notified under that power. The Department of Personnel and Training records in paragraph 14.3 of its Annual Report 2024-25 that 17 of the 19 benches sit at the principal seats of High Courts and the remaining two at Jaipur and Lucknow.

The court strength is unevenly distributed, which is the practical difference between benches. Annexure IV to that report gives the Principal Bench at New Delhi six courts, Allahabad three, and Bangalore, Chandigarh, Chennai, Ernakulam, Hyderabad, Jammu, Kolkata, Mumbai and Srinagar two each, with Ahmedabad, Cuttack, Guwahati, Jabalpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Lucknow and Patna on one court each. Five benches date from 1 November 1985, being the Principal Bench, Allahabad, Madras, Calcutta and Mumbai; Bangalore, Chandigarh and Guwahati followed on 3 March 1986, Hyderabad on 3 June 1986, Ahmedabad, Cuttack, Jabalpur, Jodhpur and Patna on 30 June 1986, Ernakulam on 1 September 1988, and Jaipur and Lucknow on 15 October 1991.

The two newest benches came out of the reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir. The Jammu bench was set up on 8 June 2020 and the Srinagar bench on 23 November 2021, and Annexure V to the same report footnotes that the institution figures include more than 19,000 cases transferred from the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir during 2020 and 2021. That transfer is Section 29 of the Act operating a second time, thirty-five years after the 13,350 cases it moved in 1985.

Circuit sittings carry the Tribunal to places where no bench sits. The Principal Bench sits at Nainital, the Calcutta bench at Port Blair and Gangtok, Chandigarh at Shimla, Madras at Pondicherry, Guwahati at Shillong, Itanagar, Kohima, Agartala, Imphal and Aizawl, Jabalpur at Indore, Gwalior and Bilaspur, Bombay at Nagpur, Chhatrapati Sambhaji Nagar and Goa, Patna at Ranchi, Ernakulam at Lakshadweep, Jammu at Leh and Srinagar at Kargil. The practice exists because Sampath Kumar directed the Government to establish permanent or circuit benches wherever a High Court sits.

Composition under the Act

Section 5(1), as substituted by Act 1 of 2007 with effect from 19 February 2007, provides that each Tribunal consists of a Chairman and such number of judicial and administrative members as the appropriate Government deems fit. The same amendment abolished the separate office of Vice-Chairman; Section 3(u) now defines a Vice-Chairman as a member authorised to perform administrative functions at a bench.

Section 5(2), as substituted by Act 19 of 1986 with effect from 1 November 1985, requires a bench to consist of one judicial member and one administrative member. That composition was the direct legislative answer to Sampath Kumar. Section 5(4) allows the Chairman to transfer a member from one bench to another and to constitute a larger bench, and the proviso requires every larger bench to include at least one judicial and one administrative member. Section 5(6) permits a single-member bench for specified classes of cases, subject to the referral requirement read into it by L. Chandra Kumar.

Section 6, as substituted by Act 1 of 2007, requires the Chairman to be, or to have been, a judge of a High Court. An administrative member must have held the post of Secretary to the Government of India or an equivalent-scale post for at least two years, or that of Additional Secretary or an equivalent-scale post for at least five years. A judicial member must be, or be qualified to be, a judge of a High Court, or have held the post of Secretary in the Department of Legal Affairs or the Legislative Department, including Member-Secretary of the Law Commission of India, for two years, or that of Additional Secretary in those departments for five years. Section 6(3) requires appointment by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

Section 8, as substituted by Act 1 of 2007, fixed a term of five years for the Chairman with an age limit of sixty-eight, and five years for a member, extendable by one further term of five years, with an age limit of sixty-five. Section 8(3) provides that the conditions of service of the Chairman and members are the same as those applicable to judges of a High Court. Section 9 permits removal only by order of the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, after an inquiry made by a judge of the Supreme Court in which the person has been informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

Section 9(1) allows resignation by notice in writing to the President, with a proviso that keeps the person in office until the earliest of three months from receipt of the notice, the entry into office of a duly appointed successor, or the expiry of his term, unless the President permits an earlier relinquishment.

Section 11 imposes three restrictions worth noting. On ceasing to hold office, the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal is ineligible for further employment under the Government of India or under a State Government. A member other than the Chairman is eligible for appointment as Chairman of that Tribunal or as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or member of any other Tribunal, but for no other employment under the Union or a State. No Chairman or member may appear, act or plead before the Tribunal of which he was a member. The Explanation extends “employment” to a local or other authority and to a government-owned or controlled corporation or society, so the bar is not confined to a government post proper.

One proviso in Section 10 matters to a serving officer weighing the appointment. Inserted by Act 1 of 2007, it deems a serving Government officer appointed as a member to have retired from his service on the date he assumes charge, while allowing him at his option to reckon subsequent service as a member as post-retirement re-employment counting for pension and other retirement benefits in the service to which he belonged. The proviso before it bars any variation of salary, allowances or other conditions of service to a member’s disadvantage after appointment.

The selection process itself is administrative. The Department of Personnel and Training records in paragraph 14.5 of its Annual Report 2024-25 that appointment of the Chairperson and members is made on the recommendations of a Search-cum-Selection Committee chaired by the Chief Justice of India or a sitting judge of the Supreme Court nominated by him, and that appointments are then made with the approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Paragraph 14.11 records a posting convention adopted on the Supreme Court’s general directions: a judicial member who earlier practised as an advocate at a station should not normally be considered for posting to the bench at that station. Justice Ranjit Vasantrao More, previously Chief Justice of the Meghalaya High Court, was appointed Chairman with effect from 30 July 2022.

The 2021 reform and its fall

Section 10-B, inserted by Section 176 of the Finance Act, 2017 with effect from 26 May 2017 and amended by Section 15 of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 with effect from 4 April 2021, channelled the qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries, resignation, removal and other conditions of service of the Chairman and members appointed after the commencement of that Act into Chapter II of it, with a proviso preserving the old Act for persons appointed earlier.

The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 (Act No. 33 of 2021), assented on 13 August 2021 and deemed to have come into force on 4 April 2021, listed the Central Administrative Tribunal as entry 5 of its First Schedule and the State Administrative Tribunals as entry 6. Its Chapter II set a minimum age of fifty for appointment, a Search-cum-Selection Committee that recommended a panel of two names for each post, and a term of four years or age seventy for the Chairperson and four years or age sixty-seven for a member.

Those provisions no longer stand. In Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1330, decided on 19 November 2025 by B.R. Gavai CJI and K. Vinod Chandran J, the Supreme Court struck down Sections 3(1), 3(7), 5 and 7(1) of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 as unconstitutional, holding that the Act did through those sections what the struck-down 2021 Ordinance had done through amendments to Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017. The judgment holds that unless Parliament enacts appropriate legislation that faithfully gives effect to the principles laid down earlier, the directions in the fourth and fifth Madras Bar Association decisions continue to govern all matters relating to appointment, qualifications, tenure, service conditions and allied aspects concerning tribunal members and chairpersons. The Court directed the establishment of a National Tribunals Commission within four months.

The interim framework is therefore judicial rather than statutory. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, decided on 27 November 2020, directs a five-member Search-cum-Selection Committee chaired by the Chief Justice of India or a nominee with a casting vote; recommendation of one name per post with a second name in a waiting list rather than a panel; a term of five years with eligibility for reappointment; retirement at sixty-seven for members; eligibility of advocates with at least ten years at the Bar as judicial members; and appointment within three months of the Committee completing its selection. The fifth decision, of 14 July 2021, struck down the four-year tenure and the minimum age of fifty, while upholding the protection that gives persons appointed between 26 May 2017 and 4 April 2021 a five-year term.

The line of cases behind these directions begins with Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1, decided on 13 November 2019 by a Constitution Bench of five judges, which struck down the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 for excessive executive interference and referred the question whether Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017 could validly be passed as a Money Bill to a larger bench.

Caseload

The Tribunal had received 9,88,738 cases since its inception in 1985 and disposed of 9,19,157 of them as on 31 January 2026, leaving 69,581 under adjudication. Those are the figures the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions placed before the Lok Sabha in a written reply released on 25 March 2026. The Department of Personnel and Training gave the position one year earlier in paragraph 14.8 of its Annual Report 2024-25: 9,62,025 cases received up to 31 March 2025, 8,92,086 disposed of, and a pendency of 69,939.

Disposals have run ahead of fresh institutions for three consecutive years, which is why the pendency is nearly flat despite institutions above 30,000 a year.

The long series in Annexure V to the Annual Report 2024-25 shows where the present backlog came from. Institution has been stable, between 24,000 and 30,000 a year from 2009 to 2022 and 32,998 at its highest in 2024. Disposal is what moved: it fell to 12,616 in 2020 and 17,395 in 2021, against 26,040 in 2019, and pendency climbed from 49,011 at the end of 2019 to a peak of 80,545 at the end of 2022. It has fallen in each year since, to 74,615, then 72,153, then 69,939 at the end of March 2025. The Tribunal is carrying roughly two years of institutions as backlog, and the pandemic years account for most of it.

What changed between 2020 and 2026

The appointment framework is now a set of Supreme Court directions rather than an enacted statute, which is the largest of five changes in the six years to 2026. The four-year tenure and the minimum age of fifty introduced by the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 were struck down on 19 November 2025, so the operative tenure is five years and there is no statutory minimum age, and advocates with at least ten years at the Bar are eligible for appointment as judicial members. The Act now extends to Jammu and Kashmir and to Ladakh without the special modification that Section 1(2)(b) once carried, that clause having been omitted with effect from 31 October 2019, and the Jammu and Srinagar benches set up on 8 June 2020 and 23 November 2021 absorbed more than 19,000 cases transferred from the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir. Disposal has recovered from the pandemic collapse, exceeding institution in each of 2023, 2024 and 2025 and bringing pendency down from 80,545 at the end of 2022 to 69,581 as on 31 January 2026. And the Court’s ruling in S. Lalitha of 24 April 2025 has narrowed the use of a belated representation as a device to restart limitation.

Related Articles

• Central government employees in India
• CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
• Article 311 of the Constitution
• Departmental inquiry
• Charge sheet and articles of charge
• Major and minor penalty proceedings
• Appeal, review and revision under the CCS (CCA) Rules
• Suspension of a government servant
• Subsistence allowance during suspension
• Dismissal and removal from service
• Reduction in rank as a penalty
• Penalty proportionality in disciplinary matters
• Principles of natural justice
• Speaking order
• De novo inquiry
• Reinstatement after a penalty is set aside
• Sealed cover procedure
• Memorial to the President
• CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964
• Vigilance clearance
• Armed Forces Tribunal
• State Administrative Tribunal
• Judicial review in service matters
• Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
• Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021
• Probation in central government service
• Confirmation in service
• Deemed confirmation
• Departmental Promotion Committee
• Retirement age of central government employees
• Premature retirement under FR 56(j)
• Resignation from government service
• Re-employment after retirement
• Withholding of pension
• CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021
• Department of Personnel and Training
• Union Public Service Commission
• Stepping up of pay
• Notional increment on superannuation

External references

• Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, bare Act (India Code)
• Department of Personnel and Training, Annual Report 2024-25, Chapter 14 and Annexures IV and V
• Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, bare rules
• Central Administrative Tribunal, official website
• Central Administrative Tribunal, Case Information System
• Pending cases under the Central Administrative Tribunal, written reply of 25 March 2026
• Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, bare Act (Department of Revenue)
• Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, bare Act (India Code)

References

1. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Act No. 13 of 1985), assented on 27 February 1985, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 10-B, 11, 14 to 19, 20, 21, 22 to 27, 28 and 29.
2. Notification G.S.R. 527(E) dated 1 July 1985, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3(i), appointing the date of commencement under Section 1(3).
3. Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 46, inserting Part XIV-A and Articles 323-A and 323-B.
4. Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, notified by G.S.R. 17(E) dated 6 January 1987 under Section 35(2)(d), (e) and (f) and Section 36(c), in force from 15 January 1987, Rules 2 to 19, 26, 27 and 29, as amended by G.S.R. 1000(E) dated 11 October 1988, G.S.R. 99(E) dated 26 February 1991, G.S.R. 557(E) dated 4 September 1991 and G.S.R. 756(E) dated 18 October 1994.
5. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, decided on 18 March 1997 by a bench of seven judges.
6. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124, decided on 9 December 1986.
7. Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177, decided on 14 March 1989.
8. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, decided on 1 November 1995.
9. Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, decided on 27 August 1997.
10. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1, decided on 13 November 2019.
11. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, decided on 27 November 2020, and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, decided on 14 July 2021.
12. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1330, decided on 19 November 2025.
13. The Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 INSC 565, decided on 24 April 2025.
14. Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 (Act No. 33 of 2021), assented on 13 August 2021, Sections 3, 5, 7 and 15, and the First Schedule.
15. Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (Act No. 55 of 2007), assented on 25 December 2007.
16. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 (Act 34 of 2019), omitting Section 1(2)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 with effect from 31 October 2019.
17. Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 19 of 1986), Sections 3 and 6, omitting Section 2(b) and substituting Section 5(2) with effect from 1 November 1985; and Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 2006 (Act 1 of 2007), substituting Sections 5(1), 6, 8 and 12 with effect from 19 February 2007.
18. Department of Personnel and Training, Annual Report 2024-25, Chapter 14 (paragraphs 14.3 to 14.13), Annexure IV on benches, courts and circuit sittings, and Annexure V on institution, disposal and pendency since inception.
19. Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, written reply on pending cases under the Central Administrative Tribunal, released 25 March 2026, giving figures as on 31 January 2026 and bench-wise institution and disposal for 2023 to 2025.