Appeal, Review and Revision under the CCS (CCA) Rules

Appeal, revision and review are the three internal remedies that the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 give a central government servant against an order of suspension or penalty. The appeal is governed by Rules 23 to 28 in Part VII and must be preferred within 45 days. Revision under Rule 29 and review under Rule 29-A sit in Part VIII, and neither depends on the servant asking for it.

The rules were notified by the Ministry of Home Affairs by notification No. 7/2/63-Estt.(A) dated 20 November 1965, under the proviso to Article 309 and Article 148(5) of the Constitution, after consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor-General for the Indian Audit and Accounts Department. Part VII carries the appeal machinery in Rules 22 to 28. Part VIII, headed Revision and Review, carries Rule 29 and Rule 29-A. Rule 30, on service of orders and notices, sits in Part IX and is what fixes the date from which the appeal period runs.

Each stage is narrower than the one before it, and that narrowing is deliberate. One appeal lies against one order, and Rule 22 removes three classes of order from appeal altogether. Revision reaches an order that was never appealed or that could not be appealed. Review reaches a settled order only when new material changes the nature of the case. A servant who treats revision as a second appeal on the merits, or review as a second chance to re-argue the same record, will find the remedy refused on its own terms rather than on the merits.

The appeal is also the only forum in which the severity of the punishment is genuinely open. Rule 27(2)(c) obliges the appellate authority to consider whether the penalty is adequate, inadequate or severe. The Central Administrative Tribunal will not reopen that question in the same way, because Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177, holds that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to interfere with punishment cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. A servant who saves the argument that the penalty is too harsh for the Tribunal has usually saved it for the wrong forum.

This article sets out who the machinery covers and who appeals under a different code, which orders are appealable and which are not, how the appellate authority is identified, how the 45-day period is counted, whether the penalty operates while the appeal is pending, the form the appeal must take, the three questions Rule 27(2) puts to the appellate authority, the conditions attached to enhancing a penalty, the separate powers of revision and review, the parallel machinery that applies to a pensioner under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, and the route from the department to the Tribunal.

The three internal remedies compared

Only the appeal can be compelled by the servant. Revision under Rule 29 and review under Rule 29-A are exercised by the authority on its own motion or otherwise, so a petition invoking either is a request that the authority act, not the exercise of a right. The three remedies differ in who exercises them, what triggers them, and what they may reach.

The full rule map of the two parts is worth setting out once, because the numbering is easy to transpose.

Who the appeal machinery covers

The appeal in Rules 22 to 28 is not available to every government servant. Rule 3(1) of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 applies the rules to every Government servant including every civilian Government servant in the Defence Services, and then excludes five categories: railway servants as defined in Rule 102 of Volume I of the Indian Railway Establishment Code; members of the All India Services; persons in casual employment; persons subject to discharge from service on less than one month’s notice; and persons for whom special provision is made in respect of these matters by or under any law in force or by an agreement approved by the President.

A civilian storekeeper, clerk or engineer in an ordnance establishment appeals under Rule 23 like any other central civil servant. A member of the armed forces does not, and not because Rule 3 excludes him: he is not a civil servant, and the code reaches only the civil side.

The two large excluded groups are not left without a remedy. They appeal under their own codes, which track Part VII closely and differ in four places that decide where a petition goes. A railway employee appeals under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. An officer of the Indian Administrative Service, the Indian Police Service or the Indian Forest Service appeals under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969.

The withholding power in Rule 21 of the All India Services rules has no counterpart on the central civil side and is the difference that traps most petitioners. A State Government may withhold an appeal where no right of appeal exists, where the appeal does not comply with Rule 18, where it is out of time under Rule 17 and no reasonable cause is shown, or where it repeats a previous appeal already decided without new facts. Rule 21(2) requires the appellant to be told, with reasons. Rule 21(3) supplies the cure for the second ground alone: an appeal withheld only for a defect of form may be resubmitted within one month of the date the appellant was informed, and if it then complies it may not be withheld again. Rule 22 requires the State Government to send the Central Government a list of appeals withheld in the preceding six months on 1 January and 1 July each year, and under Rule 23 the Central Government may call for any withheld appeal. An order withholding an appeal is itself not appealable, because Rule 15(1)(iv) says so; the answer to it is the memorial under Rule 25, which Rule 15(2) expressly preserves.

Two saving provisions in the central civil rules close the gaps at the edges of Rule 3. Rule 3(3) applies the rules to a servant temporarily transferred to a service or post covered by the railway or special-provision exceptions, where they would otherwise have applied but for the transfer. Rule 3(4) sends any doubt about whether the rules apply to a person, or about which service a person belongs to, to the President for decision.

Orders against which no appeal lies

Rule 22 opens with a non obstante clause and removes three classes of order from appeal: any order made by the President; any order of an interlocutory nature, or of the nature of a step in aid of the final disposal of a disciplinary proceeding, other than an order of suspension; and any order passed by an inquiring authority in the course of an inquiry under Rule 14.

Clause (i) is the reason a penalty imposed by the President cannot be appealed at all. There is no authority above the President to hear it, so the only routes left are review under Rule 29-A and an application to the Tribunal.

Clause (ii) does two things at once. It bars an appeal against the procedural steps that make up a departmental inquiry, and it then carves out suspension, which is interlocutory in character but is deliberately made appealable. The carve-out matters, because a suspension can run for years and consume the servant’s pay down to a subsistence allowance while the inquiry proceeds.

Clause (iii) is the one most often misread. A ruling by the inquiry officer refusing a document, refusing a defence assistant, or declining to summon a witness cannot be appealed while the inquiry is running. The grievance is not lost. It is preserved and raised in the appeal against the final penalty, where Rule 27(2)(a) puts procedural non-compliance squarely before the appellate authority.

Orders against which an appeal lies

Rule 23 opens with the words “Subject to the provisions of rule 22”, and then lists five heads. The first three concern discipline directly. An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 10 is appealable. An order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 is appealable, whether it was made by the disciplinary authority or by an appellate or revising authority. An order enhancing any penalty imposed under Rule 11 is separately appealable.

The fourth head reaches beyond discipline. An order that denies or varies to the servant’s disadvantage his pay, allowances, pension or other conditions of service as regulated by rules or by agreement is appealable, as is an order that interprets any such rule or agreement to his disadvantage.

The fifth head lists six specific orders: stopping the servant at the efficiency bar on the ground of unfitness to cross it; reverting an officiating servant to a lower service, grade or post otherwise than as a penalty; reducing or withholding the pension or denying the maximum pension admissible under the rules; determining the subsistence and other allowances payable for the period of suspension; determining pay and allowances for the period of suspension or for the period between dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction in rank and reinstatement; and determining whether that intervening period is to be treated as duty for any purpose.

Two definitional points sit in the Explanation to Rule 23 and both are load-bearing. The expression Government servant includes a person who has ceased to be in Government service, so a retired, removed, dismissed or resigned employee retains the right of appeal. The expression pension includes additional pension, gratuity and any other retirement benefit, which is what pulls a death gratuity or a retirement gratuity decision into Rule 23(v)(c).

One item is frequently and wrongly read into this list. Rule 23 contains no clause on seniority. A seniority grievance is not an appealable order under Part VII; it travels as a representation and then, if it is not redressed, to the Tribunal.

A point of practice governs the suspension appeal specifically. Where a servant is suspended on the ground of contemplated proceedings and no charge sheet issues within three months, Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 35014/1/81-Estt.(A) dated 9 November 1982 requires the reasons for the suspension to be communicated on the expiry of that period, and the 45-day period for the Rule 23(i) appeal is then counted from the date those reasons are communicated rather than from the suspension order itself. The instruction does not apply where the suspension rests on grounds relating to the security of the State.

Identifying the appellate authority

Rule 24(1) sets a hierarchy of sources rather than a single formula. The appellate authority is the one specified in the Schedule to the rules, or by a general or special order of the President. Only where no such authority is specified does the default in Rule 24(1) operate, and that default differs by group.

For a Central Service or a Central Civil Post in Group A or Group B, the appeal lies to the appointing authority where the order appealed against was made by an authority subordinate to it, and to the President where the order was made by any other authority. For a Central Civil Service or a Central Civil Post in Group C or Group D, the appeal lies to the authority to which the authority making the order is immediately subordinate.

The widely repeated formula that an appeal lies to the authority next above is therefore the Group C and Group D default. Applying it to a Group A officer produces the wrong forum and an appeal that has to be re-filed, often after limitation has run.

Rule 24(2) supplies two overrides. An appeal against an order passed in a common proceeding under Rule 18 lies to the authority to which the authority functioning as disciplinary authority for that proceeding is immediately subordinate, and where that authority is itself subordinate to the President in respect of a servant for whom the President is the appellate authority, the appeal lies to the President. The second override closes an obvious gap: where the person who made the order appealed against becomes, by subsequent appointment or otherwise, the appellate authority for that order, the appeal lies to the authority to which that person is immediately subordinate. A promoted officer cannot hear an appeal against his own order.

Rule 24(3) adds a narrow right of appeal directly to the President. Where a Rule 11 penalty is imposed by an authority other than the President in respect of the servant’s activities connected with his work as an office-bearer of an association, federation or union participating in the Joint Consultative Machinery, and no appeal otherwise lies to the President, the servant may appeal to the President. The governing instruction is Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 7/14/64-Ests.(A) dated 18 April 1967.

The 45-day limitation and the date it runs from

Rule 25 fixes the period and the event in a single sentence.

No appeal preferred under this part shall be entertained unless such appeal is preferred within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order appealed against is delivered to the appellant: Provided that the appellate authority may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time.

Three things follow. The period is 45 days, not 30 and not 60. It runs from the date on which a copy of the order is delivered to the appellant, not from the date the order was signed and not from the date it was put in the post. And the power to condone delay rests with the appellate authority, on satisfaction of sufficient cause, with Rule 31 supplying a wider residual power to relax a time limit for good and sufficient reasons.

This is why Rule 30 is not a formality. It provides that every order, notice and other process made or issued under the rules is to be served in person on the servant or communicated by registered post. Those two modes are what fix the delivery date on which Rule 25 turns, so a defect in service is simultaneously an answer to a plea of limitation.

Form and contents of the appeal

Rule 26(1) requires that every person preferring an appeal do so separately and in his own name. A joint appeal is not allowed, and an association cannot appeal on a member’s behalf.

Rule 26(2) sets the routing and the content requirements together. The appeal is presented to the authority to whom the appeal lies, with a copy forwarded by the appellant to the authority which made the order appealed against. It must contain all material statements and arguments on which the appellant relies, must not contain any disrespectful or improper language, and must be complete in itself.

The routing is the opposite of what many appellants assume. The appeal does not travel through the disciplinary authority to the appellate authority. It goes directly to the appellate authority, and the copy is the courtesy owed to the authority below. Filing only with the disciplinary authority and waiting for it to be forwarded is a real cause of appeals being treated as time-barred.

The requirement that the appeal be complete in itself has teeth as well. An appeal that says no more than that the appellant relies on the written statement of defence already filed does not comply, because it incorporates by reference rather than setting out the material statements and arguments. So does an appeal drafted in intemperate language, which Rule 26(2) makes a ground of objection independent of the merits.

Rule 26(3) puts a corresponding duty on the authority below. On receipt of a copy of the appeal it must forward the same, with its comments and the relevant records, to the appellate authority “without any avoidable delay, and without waiting for any direction from the appellate authority”. No number of days is prescribed. The obligation is self-executing, and the absence of a direction from above is not a reason to hold the file.

The three questions the appellate authority must answer

Rule 27(2) of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 puts three questions to the appellate authority on an appeal against a penalty: whether the procedure was complied with, whether the findings are warranted by the evidence, and whether the penalty is adequate, inadequate or severe. Rule 27 splits by the kind of order under appeal, and a suspension appeal carries a different and narrower test.

On an appeal against an order of suspension, Rule 27(1) directs the appellate authority to consider whether, in the light of Rule 10 and having regard to the circumstances of the case, the order of suspension is justified, and to confirm or revoke it accordingly. There are two outcomes and no third.

On an appeal against a penalty, or against an order enhancing a penalty, Rule 27(2) sets three statutory questions:

1. Whether the procedure laid down in the rules has been complied with and, if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice.
2. Whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record.
3. Whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe.

The first question is a two-stage test and is regularly collapsed into one stage by both sides. Procedural non-compliance alone does not carry the appeal. The appellant has to show that the non-compliance violated a provision of the Constitution, which in practice means Article 311(2) and the reasonable opportunity it guarantees, or that it caused a failure of justice. Failure to supply the inquiry report before the penalty order, which Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, requires, is the standard example of non-compliance that meets the second limb where prejudice is shown.

The third question uses the statutory triplet “adequate, inadequate or severe”. The word inadequate is in the rule for a reason: the appellate authority is part of the disciplinary machinery and may find the penalty too light as readily as too heavy, which is what makes an appeal a genuine risk and not a free option.

Having considered those questions, the appellate authority may pass orders confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty, or remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty, or to any other authority, with such direction as it deems fit. Remittal is expressly conferred, and it is not confined to the authority that passed the original order. Where an inquiry is defective at an identifiable stage, remittal to that stage is the ordinary remedy rather than exoneration.

Rule 27(3) covers every other appealable order under Rule 23, and sets an open standard: the appellate authority considers all the circumstances of the case and makes such orders as it deems just and equitable.

Enhancement of a penalty

The four provisos to Rule 27(2) govern enhancement, and between them they close every route to an enhanced penalty without prior notice.

Where the enhanced penalty proposed is one of the major penalties in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 and no inquiry under Rule 14 has already been held, the appellate authority must itself hold such an inquiry, or direct that it be held in accordance with Rule 14, and then decide on a consideration of those proceedings. This is subject only to Rule 19, which is the provision permitting an inquiry to be dispensed with in the three situations covered by the second proviso to Article 311(2). In practical terms, an appellate authority cannot convert a censure into a removal on the strength of the existing record alone.

Where a Rule 14 inquiry has already been held and the proposal is to enhance to a major penalty, the appellate authority may pass such orders as it deems fit after the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the proposed penalty.

In every other case of enhancement, no order imposing an enhanced penalty may be made unless the appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity, as far as may be in accordance with Rule 16, of making a representation against the enhanced penalty. That covers the enhancement of one minor penalty to another, such as moving from a censure to withholding of an increment.

The distinction between the major and minor penalty routes therefore reappears at the appellate stage in a slightly different form. At the original stage the route is chosen by the penalty the disciplinary authority intends to impose. At the appellate stage the question is whether the penalty the appellate authority intends to substitute has already been supported by a Rule 14 inquiry.

Personal hearing, defence assistance and consultation with the Commission

Rule 27 does not provide for a personal hearing, and none is claimable as of right. Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 11012/20/85-Estt.(A) dated 28 October 1985, issued on a recommendation of a committee of the National Council of the Joint Consultative Machinery, provides that where the appeal is against a major penalty and the appellant makes a specific request, the appellate authority may allow a personal hearing at its discretion after weighing all relevant circumstances. Office Memorandum No. 11012/2/91-Estt.(A) dated 23 April 1991, following the National Council meeting of 31 January 1991, adds that wherever such a hearing is allowed the servant may also be permitted a defence assistant on request. A blanket departmental policy of refusing hearings is therefore a failure to exercise a discretion rather than a lawful exercise of it.

Consultation with the Union Public Service Commission is governed by the first proviso to Rule 27(2). The Commission is to be consulted in all cases where such consultation is necessary, and the servant must have been given an opportunity of representing against the Commission’s advice within the time limit in Rule 15(3)(b), which is 15 days from receipt of a copy of the advice. That requirement to supply the advice reached Part VII through the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Amendment Rules, 2014, notified as G.S.R. 769(E) dated 31 October 2014 and explained in Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 11012/8/2011-Estt.(A) dated 19 November 2014, which amended Rules 15, 16, 17, 19, 27, 29 and 29-A together. The 15-day figure was inserted into the same three Part VII and Part VIII provisos by the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Amendment Rules, 2017, G.S.R. 548(E) dated 2 June 2017, the same notification that capped the time for the written statement of defence in a charge sheet at 15 days extendable to 45.

The 2014 amendment was driven by Union of India v. S.K. Kapoor, (2011) 4 SCC 589, which held that material relied on in departmental proceedings must be supplied to the servant in advance. The Office Memorandum of 19 November 2014 directs that where a penalty was imposed after 16 March 2011 in reliance on the Commission’s advice without a copy being supplied, the penalty may be set aside and the proceedings resumed from the stage of supply.

Consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission works differently, because it rests on executive instructions rather than the rules. Chapter XVII of the Vigilance Manual, reproduced in the Department of Personnel and Training Handbook for Inquiry Officers and Disciplinary Authorities, 2013, provides that where the Union Public Service Commission is not to be consulted, an appeal or revision case should be referred to the Central Vigilance Commission where the appellate or revising authority proposes to modify or set aside a penalty imposed in a case in which the Commission was earlier consulted. No fresh reference is needed where the authority declines to modify or set aside the penalty, or where the modification stays within the band the Commission earlier advised.

Implementation of the appellate order

Rule 28 is one sentence: the authority which made the order appealed against shall give effect to the orders passed by the appellate authority.

The duty falls on the original authority, not on the appellate authority, and it carries no time limit. That combination is the source of most post-appeal litigation. Where an appeal succeeds and a penalty is set aside, what follows is a set of consequential questions the appellate order may or may not have answered: arrears of pay, restoration of the pay stage and the lien, the treatment of the intervening period for qualifying service, and the effect on a sealed cover held back during the proceedings. Rule 23(v)(e) and Rule 23(v)(f) make the orders determining pay for that period and the treatment of that period separately appealable, which is the mechanism for pursuing them when the department implements the appellate order narrowly.

Whether an appeal stays the penalty

Filing an appeal does not stop the penalty from operating. Part VII of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 contains no provision suspending the order appealed against, and Rules 22 to 28 confer no power of stay on the appellate authority. A reduction to a lower stage in the time scale, a withholding of increment, a recovery from pay, or a removal from service therefore takes effect on the terms of the penalty order itself while the appeal is pending.

Rule 28 confirms the direction of travel. It obliges the authority that made the order appealed against to give effect to the orders passed by the appellate authority, which is a duty that arises when the appeal is decided, not one that holds the original order in suspense until then.

Suspension is the one place where an interim remedy exists inside the rules, and it exists because Rule 27(1) is worded differently. On an appeal against an order of suspension the appellate authority considers whether the suspension is justified in the light of Rule 10 and either confirms or revokes it. Revocation ends the suspension and restores full pay in place of the subsistence allowance, which is the practical reason the Rule 23(i) appeal is worth filing early rather than saving for the final penalty.

At the Tribunal the position is governed by Section 24 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and it is more restrictive than the equivalent practice in a civil court. No interim order by way of injunction or stay may be made unless copies of the application and of all documents supporting the plea for the interim order have been furnished to the party against whom it is sought, and that party has been given an opportunity of being heard. The proviso allows a Tribunal to dispense with both requirements as an exceptional measure, for reasons recorded in writing, where it is satisfied that this is necessary to prevent a loss to the applicant that cannot be adequately compensated in money. An interim order so made lapses after fourteen days unless the two requirements are complied with within that period and the Tribunal continues its operation.

The consequence for a servant facing recovery or a reduction in pay is that the money moves while the remedy runs. Where the appeal succeeds, restoration is a separate exercise, and Rule 23(v)(e) and Rule 23(v)(f) make the orders determining pay for the intervening period and the treatment of that period separately appealable precisely because a department may implement an appellate order narrowly.

Revision under Rule 29

Rule 29(1) empowers a listed authority to call for the records of any inquiry, at any time and either on its own motion or otherwise, and to revise any order made under the rules from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred, or from which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission where such consultation is necessary.

Six categories of authority may revise. The President; the Comptroller and Auditor-General, for a servant serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department; the Member (Personnel) of the Postal Services Board for a servant serving in or under that Board, and the Adviser (Human Resources Development) in the Department of Telecommunications for a servant serving in or under the Telecommunications Board; the Head of a Department directly under the Central Government, for a servant serving in a department or office under that Head; the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be revised; and any other authority specified by the President by general or special order, within such time as that order prescribes.

The six-month limit attaches to the appellate authority alone. Every other authority in the list acts at any time, and there is no general period after which an order becomes immune from revision. The second proviso to Rule 29(1) supplies the only structural check on the middle categories: the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the Member (Personnel), the Adviser (Human Resources Development) and a Head of Department cannot revise unless the authority which made the order in appeal, or the authority to which an appeal would lie where none was preferred, is subordinate to that revising authority.

The powers under revision are wider than the appellate powers in one specific respect. The revising authority may confirm, modify or set aside the order; may confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; may remit the case to the authority which made the order, or to any other authority, directing such further enquiry as it considers proper; and may pass such other orders as it deems fit. The power to impose a penalty where none was imposed is what allows revision to reach an order of exoneration.

The first proviso to Rule 29(1) attaches the same protections that govern enhancement on appeal. No order imposing or enhancing a penalty may be made unless the servant has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed. Where a major penalty in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 is proposed, or an enhancement to such a penalty, and no Rule 14 inquiry has already been held, no such penalty may be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in Rule 14, subject to Rule 19, and except after consultation with the Commission where necessary with the servant given the opportunity to represent against the advice within the Rule 15(3)(b) period.

Rule 29(2) fixes the sequence. No proceeding for revision may be commenced until the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal, or, where an appeal has been preferred, until the disposal of that appeal. Revision can therefore neither pre-empt an appeal nor run alongside one.

Rule 29(3) imports the appellate machinery wholesale: an application for revision is to be dealt with in the same manner as if it were an appeal under the rules. The three Rule 27(2) questions apply to the revising authority in the same terms.

On how often the power may be exercised, the governing instruction is Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Office Memorandum No. 11012/1/80-Ests.(A) dated 3 September 1981. It records the Law Ministry’s view, following the Delhi High Court in R.K. Gupta v. Union of India, that the President cannot invoke the revisionary power in a matter in which those powers have already been exercised after the facts and circumstances were fully considered, but that there is no bar on the President reviewing his own earlier revisional order under Rule 29-A if fresh facts later change the complexion of the case. The practical position is that revision is available once on a given order, and a second reopening runs only through Rule 29-A and only on new material.

A second instruction addresses a specific procedural error. Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 39/2/68-Ests.(A) dated 14 May 1968, on the procedure to be followed while proposing enhancement of a penalty already imposed, corrects the practice of cancelling the subordinate authority’s penalty first and then issuing a show cause notice proposing a higher penalty. Cancelling first, particularly in the President’s name, is itself a modification of the earlier order and attracts prior consultation with the Union Public Service Commission under Regulation 5(1)(c) of the Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958. The correct course is to proceed under the first proviso to Rule 29(1) without disturbing the original order, and to set that order aside only at the concluding stage, when the modifying order actually issues.

Review by the President under Rule 29-A

Rule 29-A is the narrowest of the three remedies and belongs to the President alone.

The President may, at any time, either on his own motion or otherwise review any order passed under these rules, when any new material or evidence which could not be produced or was not available at the time of passing the order under review and which has the effect of changing the nature of the case, has come, or has been brought, to his notice.

The test has three cumulative limbs, and all three must be satisfied. The material or evidence must be new. It must be material that could not be produced or was not available when the order under review was passed. And it must have the effect of changing the nature of the case. Fresh argument on the same record satisfies none of them.

There is no limitation period. The words “at any time” are in the rule, and unlike Rule 29(1)(v) no six-month cap applies to any exercise of the power.

The proviso mirrors the enhancement protections elsewhere. No order imposing or enhancing a penalty may be made unless the servant has been given a reasonable opportunity of representing against the penalty proposed; where a major penalty in Rule 11 is proposed, or a minor penalty is to be enhanced to a major one, and no Rule 14 inquiry has been held, no such penalty may be imposed except after an inquiry under Rule 14, subject to Rule 19, and except after consultation with the Commission where necessary with the servant given the Rule 15(3)(b) opportunity to represent against the advice.

Rule 29-A was inserted, and Rule 29 amended, by a notification dated 6 August 1981, published as S.O. 2126 in the Gazette dated 8 August 1981, and the heading of Part VIII was recast as Revision and Review at the same time. The amendment followed the Delhi High Court’s decision in R.K. Gupta v. Union of India, which held that the power the President had been exercising under the unamended Rule 29 was revisionary in nature and was not a power to review one’s own order. That distinction rests on Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273, where the Supreme Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power and must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. Rule 29-A exists because no authority could otherwise review its own order, and it is confined to the President because that is the only person on whom the rule confers it.

No second appeal, and the memorial to the President

No second appeal lies under the CCS (CCA) Rules. Part VII gives one appeal against a given order, and the structure of Part VIII confirms it: Rule 29(1) empowers revision of an order “from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred or from which no appeal is allowed”, and an appellate order is precisely an order from which no appeal is allowed, which is why it is revisable at all. Where the President is the appellate authority, Rule 22(i) closes the question absolutely.

One textual point is worth separating out rather than glossing over. Rule 23(ii) makes appealable an order imposing any Rule 11 penalty “whether made by the disciplinary authority or by any appellate or revising authority”, and Rule 23(iii) makes appealable an order enhancing any penalty. So where an appellate or revising authority imposes a penalty for the first time, or enhances one, that fresh order carries its own right of appeal. That is a first appeal against a new order, not a second appeal against the original penalty, and the 45-day period runs afresh from the delivery of the new order.

The memorial to the President is an extra-statutory petition. The CCS (CCA) Rules contain no memorial provision. Its constitutional footing is Article 320(3)(c), which requires the Union Public Service Commission to be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India in a civil capacity, “including memorials or petitions relating to such matters”, subject to the regulations the President may make under the first proviso to Article 320(3), which are the Union Public Service Commission (Exemption from Consultation) Regulations, 1958. Its administrative footing is Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 118/52-Ests. dated 30 April 1952 on representations from Government servants on service matters, which requires a claim to go first to the immediate official superior, bars an appeal or representation to a higher authority until the appropriate lower authority has rejected or unduly delayed the claim, and requires representations to higher authorities, expressly including those addressed to the President, to be submitted through the proper channel.

A memorial to the President has one specific effect on the route to the Tribunal, and it is not the effect most petitioners expect. Section 20(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides that a remedy by way of a memorial to the President is not deemed to be one of the remedies available for the purpose of exhaustion unless the applicant elected to submit it. Filing a memorial is therefore not a step the servant must take before approaching the Tribunal, and it does not by itself keep the cause of action alive.

Time limits for disposal of an appeal

The rules fix no deadline for deciding an appeal. Rule 25 binds the appellant to 45 days and leaves the appellate authority unbound.

The instruction that fills the gap is Office Memorandum No. 39/42/70-Ests.(A) dated 15 May 1971, on the time limit for the disposal of appeals, listed under Rule 27 in the Department of Personnel and Training’s rule-wise compendium. It does not impose a hard deadline. It requires appellate authorities to give appeals high priority, permits an overloaded appellate authority to be relieved of normal work, permits appellate work to be distributed among officers of equivalent rank and in any case not below the rank of the appellate authority by a general order under Rule 24, and requires the appellate authority to send the next higher authority a separate detailed statement of appeals pending disposal for over a month, with the reasons for the delay and the further time expected in each case. Where the President is the appellate authority, that statement goes to the Secretary of the Ministry or Department.

That instruction is easily confused with a different one that carries a firmer number. Office Memorandum No. 39/43/70-Ests.(A) dated 8 January 1971, reiterated in Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 11012/21/98-Estt.(A) dated 11 November 1998, allows the disciplinary authority three months to decide on an inquiry report. That is a deadline at the original stage, not at the appellate stage.

The practical consequence of the absence of an appellate deadline is that Section 20(2)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 becomes the effective time limit. Six months after the appeal is preferred, the servant is deemed to have exhausted the departmental remedy whether or not the appellate authority has acted, and the clock under Section 21 begins.

Proceedings against a pensioner

Proceedings that continue past retirement, or begin after it, run under Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021, notified as G.S.R. 868(E) dated 20 December 2021, and substantially substituted by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Amendment Rules, 2022, G.S.R. 770(E) dated 7 October 2022. The machinery parallels Part VII and Part VIII but is not the same machinery, and applying the CCS (CCA) rule numbers to a pensioner’s case produces the wrong forum.

Rule 8(1) as substituted names three competent authorities rather than one: the President, where the pensioner retired from a post for which the President is the appointing authority; the Secretary of the administrative Ministry or Department, where an authority subordinate to the President is the appointing authority; and the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, for a pensioner who retired from the Indian Audit and Accounts Department. Those authorities may withhold or withdraw a pension or gratuity, in whole or in part and permanently or for a specified period, and order recovery of pecuniary loss, where the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceedings to have been guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during service. A pension withheld in part may not fall below the minimum pension under Rule 44, and the first proviso requires consultation with the Union Public Service Commission only before final orders passed by the President.

The appeal route is Rule 8(6A), inserted by the 2022 amendment. Clause (a) provides that no appeal lies against any order made by the President under the rule, which parallels Rule 22(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. Clause (b) provides that an appeal against an order under Rule 8(1) passed by an authority other than the President lies to the President, who passes such orders on the appeal as he deems fit in consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.

Revision and review follow in Rule 8(7) and Rule 8(8). The President may at any time call for the records and revise any order, after consultation with the Commission, and may confirm, modify or set aside it, remit the case with directions for further enquiry, or pass such other order as he deems fit, subject to a proviso requiring a reasonable opportunity before the amount withheld or withdrawn is increased. The review power in Rule 8(8) is wider than Rule 29-A of the CCS (CCA) Rules in one respect that is easy to miss: it may be exercised “where extenuating or special circumstances exist to warrant such review” as well as on new material that changes the nature of the case. Rule 29-A has no extenuating-circumstances limb, and importing one into a CCS (CCA) review petition invites a rejection on the face of the rule.

Two limits in Rule 8(2) decide many pensioner cases before the merits are reached. Proceedings instituted under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules while the servant was in service, and continued after retirement, have no effect on pension and gratuity, so a minor penalty proceeding cannot be carried past the date of retirement in the hope of reaching the pension. And proceedings not instituted while the servant was in service require the prior sanction of the competent authority and cannot be in respect of any event that took place more than four years before institution. While such proceedings run, provisional pension at the maximum admissible rate is payable under Rule 8(3), and gratuity is withheld until final orders.

The route from the department to the Tribunal

The Central Administrative Tribunal is the forum of first instance for service disputes of central government servants, and Sections 20 and 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 decide when a servant may go there and by when.

Section 20(1) provides that a Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available under the relevant service rules for the redressal of grievances. The word ordinarily is in the statute, so exhaustion is a strong rule of practice rather than an absolute jurisdictional bar. Section 20(2) then defines exhaustion in two ways: a final order rejecting the appeal or representation, or the expiry of six months from the date the appeal was preferred or the representation made, without a final order.

Section 21 fixes limitation on that base. Where a final order has been made, the application must be filed within one year from the date of that order. Where six months expired without a final order, the application must be filed within one year from the expiry of that six-month period. Section 21(3) permits condonation where the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for the delay.

The arithmetic is worth working through once. A penalty order delivered on 1 March gives an appeal due by 15 April under Rule 25. If the appeal is filed on 10 April and decided on 20 September, the Tribunal application is due by 20 September of the following year. If the appeal is never decided, the departmental remedy is deemed exhausted on 10 October, six months after it was preferred, and the Tribunal application is due by 10 October of the following year.

One consequence of filing at the Tribunal is frequently overlooked. Section 19(4) provides that on admission of an application, every proceeding under the relevant service rules for the redressal of grievances in relation to the same subject matter that was pending immediately before admission shall abate, and no appeal or representation on that matter may thereafter be entertained under those rules. A servant who files at the Tribunal while the departmental appeal is pending loses the appeal, and with it the only forum that weighs whether the penalty is severe.

What the Tribunal does with the case is narrower than what the appellate authority does. It examines whether the rules and the principles of natural justice were followed, whether the charge was properly framed and served, whether the servant had a reasonable opportunity, and whether the finding rests on some evidence. On quantum, Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC 177, holds that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, softens that by holding that where a punishment shocks the conscience the court or Tribunal should ordinarily remit the matter to the disciplinary or appellate authority to reconsider the penalty, and only in rare cases substitute a penalty itself with cogent reasons; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, applies the same approach to a Wednesbury violation. The proportionality argument therefore usually ends in a remittal rather than a reduced penalty. Above the Tribunal, L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261, preserves the High Court’s power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227.

What the courts require of an appellate order

An appellate order under Rule 27(2) of the CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 must record reasons, and an order that does not is liable to be set aside. The word consider in the rule is the textual basis for the requirement that the order be a speaking order: the rule prescribes what has to be considered, and an order that does not disclose the consideration cannot be tested against it. Most successful challenges to appellate orders are made on this ground rather than on the merits of the charge.

The two branches of the affirmance line reconcile on the terms of the rule itself. Where the rule uses the word consider and prescribes specific questions, as Rule 27(2) does, brief reasons directed at those questions are required; an appellate authority that reproduces clauses (a), (b) and (c) and records that it is satisfied has not answered them.

Tulsiram Patel carries a point that is easy to miss in a rule where the inquiry was dispensed with under Rule 19. The Article 311 second proviso removes the inquiry at the original stage, not the remedy afterwards, and the Department of Personnel and Training’s Handbook draws the operational conclusion that an appellate authority may in such a case have to hold the inquiry itself.

Common errors

Errors by the employee, each with the rule that produces the consequence:

• Sending the appeal to the disciplinary authority instead of the appellate authority. Rule 26(2) requires presentation to the appellate authority, with a copy to the authority that passed the order, and the mistake consumes the 45-day period.
• Counting the 45 days from the date of the order. Rule 25 runs from the date on which a copy of the order is delivered, and Rule 30 fixes that date through personal service or registered post.
• Filing a joint appeal, or an appeal through an association. Rule 26(1) requires every person to appeal separately and in his own name.
• Filing an appeal that relies on an earlier reply by reference. Rule 26(2) requires the appeal to be complete in itself and to contain all material statements and arguments.
• Using intemperate language. Rule 26(2) bars disrespectful or improper language, which is a ground of objection independent of the merits.
• Appealing an interlocutory ruling of the inquiring authority. Rule 22(iii) bars it; the point belongs in the appeal against the final penalty under Rule 27(2)(a).
• Appealing an order made by the President. Rule 22(i) bars it; the routes are Rule 29-A review and the Tribunal.
• Treating revision as a second appeal on the merits. Rule 29(1) reaches only orders from which no appeal was preferred or none is allowed, and Rule 29(2) bars commencing revision before the appeal period expires or the appeal is disposed of.
• Treating review as a re-argument. Rule 29-A requires new material or evidence, unavailable or unproducible earlier, that changes the nature of the case.
• Filing at the Tribunal while the departmental appeal is pending. Section 19(4) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 abates the pending appeal on admission.
• Relying on a memorial to keep time alive. Section 20(3) of the same Act treats a memorial as a remedy only where the applicant elected to submit it.
• Assuming the penalty is suspended once the appeal is filed. Part VII carries no stay provision, and Section 24 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 restricts an interim order at the Tribunal to one made after notice, or an ex parte order that lapses in fourteen days.
• Filing under the wrong code. Rule 3(1) excludes railway servants and members of the All India Services, who appeal under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 and Rule 16 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 respectively.

Errors by departments, each with the rule or authority that makes them errors:

• Passing a one-line appellate order. R.P. Bhatt, (1986) 2 SCC 651, and Ram Chander, (1986) 3 SCC 103, require application of mind and reasons; Jagdish Sharan Varshney, (2009) 4 SCC 240, requires at least brief reasons even on affirmance.
• Reproducing the language of Rule 27(2)(a), (b) and (c) instead of answering the three questions. Ram Chander describes this as a mechanical reproduction of the phraseology and quashes it.
• Enhancing a penalty without notice. The second, third and fourth provisos to Rule 27(2) admit no exception, and where the enhancement is to a Rule 11(v) to (ix) penalty and no Rule 14 inquiry has been held, that inquiry must be held or directed.
• Cancelling the subordinate authority’s penalty first and then issuing a show cause notice for a higher penalty. Office Memorandum No. 39/2/68-Ests.(A) dated 14 May 1968 requires the original order to be set aside only at the concluding stage.
• Not supplying the Union Public Service Commission’s advice at the appellate, revisional or review stage. Required since G.S.R. 769(E) dated 31 October 2014, with the 15-day representation window imported by G.S.R. 548(E) dated 2 June 2017 through Rule 15(3)(b).
• Letting an officer who passed the order hear the appeal against it after promotion. Rule 24(2)(ii) sends the appeal to the authority to which that person is immediately subordinate.
• Applying the next-above default to a Group A or Group B servant. Rule 24(1)(i) sends the appeal to the appointing authority, or to the President where the order was made by any other authority.
• Holding the record while the appeal waits. Rule 26(3) requires the authority that made the order to forward the appeal with its comments and the relevant records without any avoidable delay and without waiting for a direction.
• Refusing a personal hearing as a matter of policy. Office Memorandum No. 11012/20/85-Estt.(A) dated 28 October 1985 makes it discretionary on a specific request in a major penalty appeal, and a blanket refusal is a failure to exercise the discretion.
• Revising as an appellate authority beyond six months. Rule 29(1)(v) confines that authority to six months from the date of the order proposed to be revised.
• Revising where the relevant lower authority is not subordinate to the revising authority. The second proviso to Rule 29(1) bars it for the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the Member (Personnel), the Adviser (Human Resources Development) and a Head of Department.
• Revising the same order twice. Office Memorandum No. 11012/1/80-Ests.(A) dated 3 September 1981 records the view that the revisionary power cannot be re-exercised where the facts and circumstances were already fully considered.
• Continuing a Rule 16 minor penalty proceeding after retirement to reach the pension. Rule 8(2)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021 gives such proceedings no effect on pension and gratuity.
• Failing to implement the appellate order. Rule 28 puts that duty on the authority that made the original order, not on the appellate authority.

Related Articles

• CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
• Departmental inquiry
• Charge sheet and articles of charge
• Major versus minor penalty proceedings
• Suspension
• Subsistence allowance
• Article 311
• Central Administrative Tribunal
• Natural justice
• Speaking order
• Memorial to the President
• Disciplinary authority
• Appointing authority
• Inquiry officer
• Defence assistant
• Common proceedings
• Penalty and proportionality
• Censure
• Withholding of increment
• Reduction in rank
• Compulsory retirement
• Reinstatement
• Sealed cover procedure
• Vigilance clearance
• Central Vigilance Commission
• Union Public Service Commission
• Department of Personnel and Training
• Joint Consultative Machinery
• CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021
• Central government pension
• Provisional pension
• Death gratuity
• Qualifying service
• Lien
• Seniority
• Probation in central government service
• Confirmation in central government service
• Premature retirement
• Retirement age in central government service
• All India Services
• Railway employees
• Dies non

External references

• CCS (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, consolidated text (DoPT)
• DoPT rule-wise index of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 with Government of India instructions
• Handbook for Inquiry Officers and Disciplinary Authorities, 2013 (DoPT)
• G.S.R. 548(E) dated 2 June 2017, CCS (CCA) Amendment Rules, 2017
• DoPT OM No. 35014/1/81-Estt.(A) dated 9 November 1982 on suspension and the appeal period
• Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, bare Act (India Code)
• CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021 (Department of Pension and Pensioners’ Welfare)
• G.S.R. 770(E) dated 7 October 2022 substituting Rule 8 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 2021
• All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, consolidated text (India Code)

References

1. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Rules 22 to 30, notified by Ministry of Home Affairs notification No. 7/2/63-Estt.(A) dated 20 November 1965.
2. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Amendment Rules, 2017, G.S.R. 548(E) dated 2 June 2017, items IV, V and VI (inserting the Rule 15(3)(b) time limit into the provisos to Rules 27, 29 and 29-A).
3. Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Amendment Rules, 2014, G.S.R. 769(E) dated 31 October 2014, explained in Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 11012/8/2011-Estt.(A) dated 19 November 2014.
4. Notification dated 6 August 1981, published as S.O. 2126 in the Gazette dated 8 August 1981, inserting Rule 29-A and amending Rule 29; recorded in Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Office Memorandum No. 11012/1/80-Ests.(A) dated 3 September 1981.
5. Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 39/2/68-Ests.(A) dated 14 May 1968, procedure to be followed while proposing enhancement of a penalty already imposed.
6. Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 11012/20/85-Estt.(A) dated 28 October 1985 and Office Memorandum No. 11012/2/91-Estt.(A) dated 23 April 1991, personal hearing and defence assistance in appeals.
7. Department of Personnel and Training Office Memorandum No. 35014/1/81-Estt.(A) dated 9 November 1982, communication of reasons for suspension and reckoning of the appeal period.
8. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, Sections 19(4), 20, 21 and 24 (conditions as to making of interim orders).
9. All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, Rules 15 to 25, particularly Rule 16 (appeal to the Central Government), Rule 17 (45-day limitation), Rule 21 (withholding of appeals) and Rule 24-A (review).
10. Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021, Rule 8, notified by G.S.R. 868(E) dated 20 December 2021 and substituted by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Amendment Rules, 2022, G.S.R. 770(E) dated 7 October 2022.
11. Handbook for Inquiry Officers and Disciplinary Authorities, Department of Personnel and Training, 2013, Chapter 29 on appeal, revision and review.